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 The globalization of capital markets enables firms to seek equity capital in foreign 
markets. Many firms that have already listed on home markets cross-list on one or 
multiple foreign capital markets (Moore et al., 2012). One of the fundamental problems 
cross-listed firms encounter is a legitimacy deficit (Bell, Moore, and Al-Shammari, 2008; 
Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed, 2012). Organizations achieve legitimacy to the extent that 
their characteristics and practices are consistent with the expectations investors have 
about firms (Zajac and Westphal, 2004; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). Prior work has 
investigated several important governance characteristics that influence how investors 
perceive foreign firms in the host country, such as board independence (Bell, Moore, and 
Filatotchev, 2012; Moore et al., 2012; Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera, 2014), managerial 
incentives (Moore et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014), insider ownership (Bell et al., 2008), 
founder-CEO, and board interlocks (Moore et al., 2012). However, very little work has 
been done to understand how state involvement in corporate governance affect foreign 
investors’ perceptions of organizational legitimacy. 
 To date, most of the research on foreign investors’ perception of legitimacy has 
focused on governance mechanisms that are common in the US market. Many foreign 
firms, however, have corporate governance mechanisms that are rare and not well 
understood in the US. Specifically, the home country government is often directly 
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involved in the corporate governance of a firm either through state ownership or political 
connections with the CEO. Foreign investor perceptions of such state involvement in 
corporate governance are likely influenced by the prevailing host-country ideologies 
regarding state interactions with corporations and prevailing perceptions of the home-
country government. Here I define state involvement in corporate governance as a direct 
involvement of government in a firm’s corporate governance through government 
ownership or prior political appointment of the CEO (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; 
Liang, Ren, and Sun, 2015).  
State involvement in corporate governance is an important component of 
corporate governance in many economies. State ownership of publicly listed firms 
‘remains pervasive around the world and has been increasing in recent years’ 
(Pargendler, 2012: 2917). Worldwide, state-owned enterprises account for one-fifth of 
global stock market capitalization (Pargendler, 2012; Liang, et al., 2015). In China the 
central government exercises influence in the economy by maintaining a controlling 
interest in a majority of firms (Luo, Wang, and Zhang, 2016). A CEO’s prior 
employment with the government is another form of state involvement (Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang, 2007). These types of state involvement are particularly prevalent in China, where 
the state plays a much larger role than any other major economy. 
In 1978 the Chinese government began to allow the private ownership of 
companies. Prior to that all firms in China were either state owned or owned by township 
collectives. The growth of private ownership of firms accelerated in 1990 with the 
opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. In that year the Chinese 
economy was the eleventh largest in the world and less than one-tenth the size of the U.S. 
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economy. Today the Chinese economy is the second largest in the world and predicted to 
overtake the U.S. economy in the next decade. Although private ownership has increased, 
most publicly traded companies have significant levels of state ownership and many 
CEOs were former officials with central government.  
Along with this extraordinary growth in the economy, the stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen have grown to become the fifth and eighth largest exchanges in 
the world. The growth of these exchanges is remarkable because the shares traded on 
these exchanges are, for the most part, only allowed to be bought and sold by Chinese 
citizens. These restrictions are being relaxed as the Chinese economy becomes more 
integrated with the rest of the world. As foreign investors have more opportunities to 
purchase equities in China, the perceptions these foreign investors have of state 
involvement will become more important. Chinese firms that are cross-listed in foreign 
markets provide an opportunity to study how foreign investors perceive government 
ownership and CEO political connections and whether these perceptions differ across 
international capital markets. 
 In this study, I develop and test hypotheses about how state involvement in 
corporate governance affect firm legitimacy in foreign capital markets. Building on 
institutional theory, this study focuses on ideology as a component of the host country’s 
institutional environment, and explores how ideologies regarding the government shape 
investor perceptions of government ownership and CEO political connections. I posit that 
investor perceptions of state involvement in corporate governance are related to the 
dominant ideologies of the capital market and so state involvement is negatively related 
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to firm legitimacy perceived by U.S. investors, but positively related to firm legitimacy 
perceived by Hong Kong investors. 
The US government is characterized as a rule-based government, where firms 
with state involvement are rare and U.S. investors assume that firms’ competitive 
advantages are not dependent on government intervention. Thus, in the U.S., ideologies 
regarding government hold that government should intervene little in business in order to 
ensure a transparent business environment. In contrast, the governments of many East 
Asian countries are characterized as authoritarian governments, where firms with state 
involvement are common and investors assume that firms’ competitive advantage rely on 
direct connections to the government. Thus, in East Asia ideologies regarding 
government emphasize positive effects of government involvement. Therefore, 
ideological conflicts are likely to arise when U.S. investors consider cross-listed firms 
with government ownership or CEO political connections. 
 This study addresses two research questions: (1) how is state involvement in firm 
corporate governance perceived by foreign investors, (2) do these perceptions differ 
across international capital markets. To answer these two research questions, I chose to 
focus on Chinese firms that cross-list in either the U.S. or Hong Kong. Cross-listing 
refers to a strategic choice of the firm to list its equity shares on one or multiple overseas 
markets in addition to its domestic listing (Karolyi, 2012). The Chinese government plays 
an important role in encouraging Chinese firms to cross-list in foreign markets, especially 
Hong Kong and New York. The results support my argument that central government 
ownership is positively related to legitimacy in the Hong Kong market and negatively 
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related to legitimacy in the U.S. market. I also found that CEO political connections are 
positively associated with legitimacy in both markets. 








 Cross-listing is a strategic choice made by a firm to list its equity shares on one or 
multiple overseas markets in addition to its domestic listing (Karolyi, 2012). Prior studies 
have identified two motivations for cross-listings: to increase the shareholder base and to 
provide a signal (Karolyi, 2006, 2012; Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009). 
 Firms cross-list to overcome regulatory restrictions and information problems that 
cause investment barriers for foreign investors (Miller, 1999; Karolyi, 2004; Lins, 
Strickland, and Zenner, 2005). Cross-listings enable foreign investors to trade shares 
easily (Abdallah and Goergen, 2008). Cross-listings enable investors on the host markets 
to buy securities of foreign firms without the inconvenience of cross-border transactions 
(Saunders, 1993). For firms that have cross-listed in developed foreign markets, their 
shares become more accessible to investors, who are often restricted from trading the 
firms’ domestic shares because of investment barriers.  
 Cross-listing on a developed stock exchange (such as the U.S. or Hong Kong) is 
also perceived as a signal of the firms’ commitments to higher standards of investor 
protection and corporate governance (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz, 2004; Hail and Leuz, 2009). Cross-listings reflect confidence of top managers in 
their ability to meet listing requirements of the foreign capital markets (McGuinness,
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 1999). Fuerst (1998), and Melvin and Valero (2009) suggested that firms use cross-
listing as a means to distinguish themselves from firms with weak governance because 
high levels of disclosure and legal requirements in global markets makes cross-listings 
more costly for firms with low governance quality. 
Chinese Firms Cross-Listed on the U.S. and Hong Kong Stock Markets 
 In the following sections, I briefly introduce A-Shares, ADRs, and H-shares. The 
Chinese stock market comprises of the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SZSE) and the 
Shanghai Securities Exchanges (SHSE), and there is no fundamental difference between 
the two exchanges in terms of regulation and legislation (Tian and Estrin, 2008). A-
shares refer to domestically listed (either on Shanghai Stock Exchanges or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges) shares of Chinese firms that are available to Chinese investors only 
(De Jonge, 2008). H-shares (Hong Kong listed shares) and A-shares (mainland listed 
shares) are traded in separate markets (McGuinness, 1999; De Jonge, 2008).  
 Firms with better performance and corporate governance are more likely to cross-
list abroad. Zhang and King (2010) found that larger firms with higher profitability are 
more likely to list ADRs compared to domestic counterparts. Similarly, Pan, Lin, and 
Yang (2013) demonstrated that cross-listed firms, compared to firms only listed in the 
domestic market, have better corporate governance and better performance. Sami and 
Zhou (2008) found that cross-listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk and 
higher firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) than non-cross-listed firms in the domestic 
market, which is consistent with Doidge and colleagues’ (2004) findings. 
 The Chinese government plays an important role in directing the location pattern 
of Chinese firms’ foreign listings, especially for firms with government ownership. In 
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order to create national prestige and increase global visibility, the Chinese government 
encourages firms to list on foreign markets, especially New York and Hong Kong. 
Accordingly, many flagship state-owned enterprises, directed by the central government, 
are listed on the U.S. and Hong Kong markets (Pan and Brooker, 2014). The US stock 
market is the main destination favored by Chinese state-owned firms, because of its “gold 
standards” for corporate governance, the most established financial standards and 
financial regulations (Pan and Brooker, 2014). The central government aims to coerce 
state-owned firms to improve corporate governance and practices, and thus encourage 
firms to list in the U.S. since New York is the global financial center and an ideal listing 
destination. The Hong Kong stock market is also favored by Chinese state-owned firms 
because of geographical and cultural advantages. A number of studies have highlighted 
the effect of proximity on decisions for cross-listings (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004; 
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). Proximity preferences include economic proximity, cultural 
proximity, and geographical proximity (Pan and Brooker, 2014). Hong Kong has been a 
popular destination since1997 when Hong Kong was returned to China. A growing 
number of Chinese firms are listed on the Hong Kong stock market (Karreman and van 
der Knaap, 2012). Yang and Lau (2006) provided some descriptive information about 
Chinese firms listed only domestically, and firms listed on the U.S. or Hong Kong stock 
market. They found that firms listed only in the domestic market are smaller than firms 
listed abroad. In addition, they demonstrated that cross-listed firms receive higher analyst 
coverage, which is consistent with Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver’s (2002) findings that 
cross-listed firms experience a significant increase in visibility. 
Cross-Listing in the US (ADRs) 
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 Foreign firms trade in the U.S. stock markets through American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs). An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a certificate representing 
shares of a non-US firm. An ADR represents a specified number (multiple shares or a 
fraction of a share) of the corresponding security at home market (Arquette, Brown, and 
Burdekin, 2008). The depositary bank set a ratio of ADRs-to-ordinary shares. For 
example, one-for-five (1:5) backing means that one ADR covers five underlying shares. 
The underlying shares are retained by a custodian bank at the home market. ADRs are 
denominated in U.S. dollars, and traded through U.S. broker-dealers during U.S. trading 
hours. The depositary bank in the U.S. manages local taxes and currency issues. The first 
ADR was created and launched in 1927 by JPMorgan. To date, there are over 2,000 
ADRs available that represent shares of firms incorporated in more than 70 countries. 
 There are three types of ADRs, and each type has different regulatory standards 
and is offered to investors through different outlets. Level I ADRs require the least 
amount of regulatory oversight and compliance. Firms issuing Level I ADRs are required 
to file an F-6 registration statement, but the firm is exempt from full SEC reporting 
requirements. The Form F-6 registration statement lists the information with respect to 
the rights of ADR holders, obligations of the depositary, and the depositary mechanism. 
The depositary bank is required to provide the SEC with information on a semi-annual 
basis concerning the number of depositary shares, and the name of dealers having 
depositary shares. Level I ADRs are traded over the counter (OTC) in the U.S., and the 
prices are reported to the U.S. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 
Investors can obtain such information through sources such as OTC markets, Bloomberg, 
and Reuters (BNY Mellon, 2015). 
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 Compared with Level I ADR issuers, firms issuing Level II ADRs have greater 
exposure in the U.S. Foreign firms issuing Level II ADRs are mandated to submit an F-6 
registration statement, SEC Form 20-F (an equivalent of Form 10-K for U.S. firms), and 
annual reports in line with either US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Firms are required to file Form 
20-F within 6 months following the end of the fiscal year and disclose information 
regarding the firms’ management, business properties, securities and finances. Level II 
ADRs are listed on major U.S. stock exchanges. 
 Firms issuing level III ADRs can raise capital through a public offering in the 
U.S. Different from Level II ADR issuers, firms issuing level III ADRs are required to 
file a Form F-1 with the SEC to register the public offering. 
 The majority of ADRs in mainland Chinese stocks fall within the Level I category 
(McGuinness, 1999). In other words, most of the ADRs in mainland Chinese stocks are 
traded over the counter. 
 Issuing ADRs enables foreign firms to have a broader investor exposure in the 
U.S. It is costly and difficult for investors to invest in foreign securities because of cross-
border settlement issues. ADRs pay dividends in U.S. dollars, which is desirable to U.S. 
investors, especially retail investors (McGuinness, 1999). In addition, some institutional 
investors, such as U.S. pension funds, cannot buy foreign stocks. ADRs provide ‘a 
legitimate vehicle through which international corporate earning streams can be accessed 
by such bodies’ (McGuinness, 1999: 200).  
 Many firms issue Level I ADRs because Level I ADRs have minimal disclosure 
requirements, and they are an inexpensive means for foreign firms to gauge interests in 
11 
 
their securities, and they tap into the equity markets in the U.S. Once foreign firms 
establish Level I programs, they start building a U.S. investor base. Thus, Level I ADRs 
serve as a useful way of raising foreign firms’ profiles in the world’s most developed 
economies (McGuinness, 1999). In addition, Level I ADRs also serve a useful role in 
preparing ADRs for Level III status. 
 ADRs are created when brokers purchase shares on the firms’ home market and 
deliver them to the local custody bank. The custodian bank instructs the depositary bank 
in the host market to issue ADRs (BNY Mellon; Gande, 1997). Take a Chinese firm 
(Firm X) issuing Level I ADRs for an example. When U.S. investors want to invest in 
Firm X, they call the broker to buy a certain number of ADRs, say 1000 ADRs of Firm 
X. Because there are no prior ADRs outstanding in the U.S., the broker goes to the 
Chinese stock market, buys 1000 shares and deposits them in a depositary bank, such as 
the Bank of New York. Once they are deposited, the depositary bank issues 1000 ADRs 
of Firm X in the U.S. market.  
 Once ADRs are issued, they can be traded like any regular securities. When 
another investor wants to buy 100 Firm X ADRs, the broker can either repeat the ADR 
creation process by going to the Chinese stock market, or by buying the ADRs that 
already exist in the U.S. market. If, for example, an investor owns 100 Firm X ADRs and 
wants to sell them but cannot find a buyer in the U.S. market, then the broker can cancel 
those ADRs and release the actual shares back to the Chinese market. 
Cross-Listing in Hong Kong (H-Shares) 
 The Hong Kong stock market is regarded as a separate and independent market 
from the mainland Chinese market (Zhang and King, 2010). Under the policy of one 
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country two systems, Hong Kong has a high degree of autonomy in most areas. In 1993, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) signed a memorandum of understanding on Sino-Hong Kong regulatory 
cooperation. The door was opened for the listing of mainland Chinese firms in the Hong 
Kong stock market. There are a growing number of mainland Chinese firms listed on the 
SEHK in the form of H-shares (Sun, Tong, and Zhang, 2013). H-shares refer to stocks of 
firms incorporated in mainland China but are listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchanges (McGuinness, 1999). H-shares are denominated in Hong Kong dollars. H-
shares and A-shares are segmented in terms of listing and trading locations (Li, Yan, and 
Greco, 2006). More specifically, H-shares are traded by investors in Hong Kong, whereas 
A-shares are traded by local investors in mainland China. H-shares are currently not 
convertible to A-shares, and vice versa (Arquette et al., 2008). 
 There are several requirements for firms to issue H-shares. According to Rule 
8.09 regarding market capitalization, the expected market capitalization of a mainland 
Chinese issuer at the time of listing must be greater than HK$200 million, of which the 
public should hold at least 25 percent of the securities (De Jonge, 2008). With respect to 
board independence, the firm is required to have at least three independent directors, and 
at least one independent director has to have accounting or financial management 
expertise (Rule 3.10). In addition, firms issuing H-share are required to have at least one-
third of independent directors.  
Organizational Legitimacy 
 Cross-listed firms suffer from the liability of foreignness in the foreign capital 
market. Similar to firms selling in foreign product markets, cross-listed firms are 
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unfamiliar to investors in the foreign capital market, and therefore encounter a variety of 
problems (Bell et al., 2012a). It is critical for cross-listed firms to overcome the liability 
of foreignness and acquire legitimacy to succeed in the foreign capital market. 
Organizational legitimacy is a generalized perception that organizational practices are 
desirable or appropriate within the socially constructed system of norms and beliefs 
(Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is a socially conferred status, and is based on the shared 
beliefs of a referent social group within the institutional environment (Moore et al., 
2012).  
Country-Level Factors that Influence Legitimacy in Foreign Capital Markets  
 The home country’s institutional factors have influence on the legitimacy of 
foreign firms seeking IPOs in foreign capital markets. Recently, Bell and colleagues (Bell 
et al., 2008; Bell et al., 2012b; Moore et al., 2012; Bell et al.,, 2014) examined factors 
that influence organizational legitimacy in foreign capital markets. Their findings 
demonstrate that the home country’s regulatory and legal environments have a significant 
influence on the success of IPOs in foreign capital markets. For example, Bell and 
colleagues (2008) examined the legitimacy of foreign IPO firms in the U.S. and they 
found that firms incorporated in countries with higher level of economic freedom are less 
underpriced. Foreign firms originating from countries with regulatory institutions similar 
to those of the host countries obtain high levels of legitimacy (Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Bell et al., 2014). Firms originating from countries with stronger regulatory environments 
and better investor protections are perceived as more legitimate by U.S. investors (Bell et 
al., 2012b).  
Firm-Level Governance Factors that Influence Legitimacy in Foreign Capital Markets 
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 In addition to the home country’s institutional environment, foreign firms’ 
legitimacy in host capital markets is also influenced by the extent to which foreign firms’ 
governance characteristics conform to the institutional environment of the host country. 
Firms adopting governance practices similar to those that have already been taken for 
granted within institutional environments provide symbolic signals to investors (Bell et 
al., 2012b; Moore et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014). Investors put large weight on firms’ 
internal corporate governance quality when making investment decisions (Bell et al., 
2012b; Gillan and Starks, 2003). Investors in the host country typically have sparse 
information with which to make a systematic evaluation of foreign firms. Thus, investors 
rely on signals by gauging whether foreign firms’ corporate governance practices are 
acceptable or appropriate (Li, Yang, and Yue, 2007). Investors are likely to invest in 
foreign firms with corporate governance practices legitimated in the host institutional 
environment (Moore et al., 2012). 
 Prior studies have found several important governance characteristics that 
influence legitimacy in the host country such as board independence (Bell et al., 2012b; 
Moore et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014), managerial incentives (Bell et al., 2014; Moore et 
al., 2012), insider ownership (Bell et al., 2008), founder-CEO, and board interlocks 
(Moore et al., 2012). In the U.S., shareholder value maximization has become the 
dominant logic (Lok, 2010). The common approach to resolving conflicts between 
managers and shareholders relies on managerial incentive alignment (Moore et al., 2012) 
and board independence (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Stock-based managerial 
incentives are prevalent in the U.S. (Coombes & Watson, 2001). Prior IPO studies have 
demonstrated that U.S. investors perceive IPO firms providing managerial stock options 
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as more legitimate (Certo, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Bell et al., 2008). In addition to 
managerial incentives, board independence serves as one of the most important signals to 
U.S. investors (Bell et al., 2012b). Board independence signals to potential investors that 
the firm has a high level monitoring and is willing to adhere to high governance 
standards. In other words, board independence indicates that the foreign firm has adopted 
governance practices that U.S. investors are accustomed to (Certo, 2003; Bell et al., 
2012b). Thus, foreign firms adopting the prevailing governance practices – having a large 
percentage of board independence - are perceived as more legitimate. Bell and colleagues 
(2012b) demonstrated that board independence is one driver of foreign IPO success. 
Research Gap 
 To date, the research examining how firm-level governance factors influence 
investor perceptions in host countries mainly focuses on governance mechanisms that are 
common in the U.S. (e.g., Bell et al., 2014). Other corporate governance factors, such as 
state involvement in corporate governance, likely influence organizational legitimacy in 
the host country. However, these factors are not well understood in the U.S. and have 
received little attention in the management literature. In addition, extant studies on 
legitimacy of foreign firms’ governance practices use the IPO context. No prior research 
has utilized cross-listings as a setting to examine organizational legitimacy. The analysis 
of cross-listings gives insight into how existing Chinese firms will be perceived by 
foreign investors, an issue that will become increasingly important as the Chinese capital 





THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Ideologies about the Government’s Role in the Economy 
 The concept of ideology comprises a set of attitudes and beliefs that are shared by 
members of a group (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993; Zald, 2000; Blee and Currier, 2005; Den 
Hond and De Bakker, 2007). Ideology provides the rationales for challenging or 
defending certain social conditions and arrangements (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007). 
Organizational scholars define ideology as a set of shared beliefs and ideas reflecting 
social experiences, potent in a particular context at a particular time (Brunsson, 1982; 
Dunbar, Dutton, and Torbert, 1982; Starbuck, 1982; Weiss and Miller, 1987). I focus on 
ideologies regarding the government’s role in the economy. 
 Based on the government’s role in directing corporate activities, Okuno-Fujiwara 
(1997) identifies two major types of government: authoritarian government and rule-
based government. Authoritarian governments are characterized by centrally-held 
jurisdictional power and minimally separated functional powers. An authoritarian 
government has ‘the means to guide and even to force the private sector to act in ways it 
prefers in achieving a certain goal’ (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997: 395). When unforeseen 
issues make original plans unworkable, authoritarian governments can freely and easily 
adjust policies to achieve goals. Because of centralized jurisdiction, authoritarian 
governments have greater ability to coordinate macro resource allocation. Authoritarian
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 governments are often criticized for their lack of transparency in decision making 
because of power concentration and limited functional separation of powers (Okuno-
Fujiwara, 1997). 
 Compared to authoritarian governments, rule-based governments provide a more 
transparent business environment. Rule-based governments provide multiple routes (e.g., 
the legislative and judicial branches) for firms ‘to have their voices heard in the 
government’ (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997: 397). Rule-based governments rely on the 
‘legislative branch as the major forum for coordinating the interests of the society’, rather 
than direct government intervention (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997: 397). 
 Ideologies in countries with rule-based governments conflict with ideologies in 
countries with authoritarian governments (Aoki, Murdock, and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997; 
Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997). More specifically, ideologies in countries with rule-based 
governments hold that governments intervene little in business. Ideologies in countries 
with rule-based governments emphasize the role of private sectors, and hold that 
economic coordination should be achieved through the market mechanism (Aoki et al., 
1997). The role of rule-based governments is limited to ‘providing a legal infrastructure 
for market transactions’ (Aoki et al., 1997: 1). Rule-based governments are assumed to 
sustain the market mechanism using coercive measures such as taxation and regulation 
(Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997). Market imperfections are resolved by private sectors. 
 In contrast, ideologies in countries with authoritarian governments hold that 
governments intervene in business. Ideologies in countries with authoritarian government 
emphasize government intervention as a mechanism for the resolution of market failure 
(Aoki et al., 1997). Authoritarian governments are considered as ‘endogenous players 
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interacting with the economic system’ instead of ‘neutral, omnipotent agents exogenously 
attached to the economic system’ (Aoki et al., 1997: 2). 
 The governments of many East Asian countries are controlled by parties that have 
‘an asymmetrically strong political power in the society’ (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997: 403). 
Observations about state-business relationships in East Asian countries, such as China, 
Korea, and Singapore, suggest that regimes of these countries are characterized as 
authoritarian (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997). In contrast, the government in the U.S. plays “a 
much reduced role in the economy" (Xia and Walker, 2015: 576). The government in the 
U.S. is considered close to the rule-based government, where ‘the separation of 
functional power is strict’ (Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997: 379).  
 In this study, I argue that investor perceptions are structured by the prevailing 
ideologies in the host market where firms are cross-listed. The prevailing ideologies 
regarding the government’s role in the economy shape investors’ interpretation of state 
involvement in corporate governance. The governments of many East Asian countries are 
characterized as authoritarian governments, where firms with state involvement are very 
common and investors assume that firms’ competitive advantage relies on direct 
connections to the legislative branch. Thus, they are likely to view state involvement as 
legitimate and good for firms’ future performance.  
 In contrast, the U.S. government is characterized as a rule-based government, 
where firms with state involvement are very rare in the local market and U.S. investors 
assume that firms’ competitive advantage is not dependent on direct connections to the 
legislative branch, but exercised in a competitive market. Thus, in the U.S. the general 
belief about government holds that state involvement is illegitimate and bad for firms’ 
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future performance. Therefore, ideological conflicts are likely to arise when U.S. 
investors interpret foreign firms with state involvement. 
 In the following section, I explain how prevailing ideologies in the U.S. and Hong 
Kong influence investor perceptions of legitimacy of cross-listed firms. 
U.S. Investor Perceptions of Government Ownership 
 In the United States, government ownership of private firms is viewed negatively 
(Janson and Yoo, 2013) because there is not a legacy of government ownership of 
industrial firms and government ownership has become increasingly uncommon in the 
twentieth century in the U.S. (Pargendler, 2012). Compared to other countries around the 
world, government ownership is rare in the U.S. except for temporary takeovers during 
wartime (Kole and Mulherin, 1997; Pargendler, 2012). For example, telephone systems 
in many countries are owned and operated by the government (Janson and Yoo, 2013) 
but not in the U.S. Although a few firms have some degree of government ownership in 
the U.S., the public generally reacts negatively to such government intervention. 
 The financial crisis of 2008 prompted the U.S. government to directly intervene 
with some public companies. American International Group (AIG) approached the 
government for support and the government invested $85 billion to prevent AIG from 
going bankrupt. An additional $49.5 billion was invested through the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) in General Motors. Both interventions were politically 
controversial but even those not ideologically opposed to the bailout were skeptical about 
the ability of the government to benefit, rather than harm, the economy through direct 
intervention. Moreover, as mentioned by Black (2010: 562), ‘government, the American 
taxpayer, and business alike all fervently wish for an end to government bailouts, for the 
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alliance of government and business has been an uneasy one.’ According to 2009 Gallup 
Poll, more than 55 percent of Americans disapproved of the U.S. government’s 
investment in General Motors, making the government the majority owner of the firm 
(Gallup, 2009). 
 In addition to the negative public reaction, businesses and investors were also 
critical of the government’s intervention. Creditors perceived a high level of political risk 
created by the U.S. government’s intervention in General Motors’ and Chrysler’s 
reorganization in 2009 (Anginer and Warburton, 2014). When the Treasury became a 
substantial shareholder of AIG and Citigroup, investors were disappointed with the level 
of company disclosure regarding the effects of the government’s stock ownership (Black, 
2010). These types of negative reactions had a significant financial cost. For example, 
Fratianni and Marchionne (2013) found that intervention announcements directed at 
specific banks were associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns.  
 U.S. investors are suspicious of government ownership because government 
ownership is rare in the U.S. (Pargendler, 2012), public reactions to government 
ownership are negative (Gallup, 2009), and the government is not perceived as a good 
shareholder (Black, 2010). Thus, there is an ideological bias against government 
ownership, even when the owner is the U.S. government. In addition to the negative 
perceptions of government ownership in general, U.S. investors are particularly 
suspicious about the Chinese government. 
U.S. investors tend to associate their perceptions of the political image of the 
Chinese government with firms incorporated in China. As Steven (2009: 24), a Financial 
Times columnist and consultant, described, ‘The country I worry about most is China,’ 
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and he suggested that China is ‘emboldened to intervene more brazenly than ever in its 
local stock markets. Government intervention in Chinese equity markets is already 
beyond the pale and is likely to get much, much worse’ (Steven, 2009: 24). According to 
the 2015 annual index and ranking created by the Heritage Foundation and The Wall 
Street Journal, the economic freedom score of the United States is 76.2, ranking it the 
12th freest in the world. The freedom economic score of mainland China is 52.7, making 
its economy the 139 freest in the world (Heritage Foundation, 2015).  
The free-market ideology in the U.S. emphasizes that firms should maximize 
shareholder value (Rappaport, 1983) but government owners often pursue political and 
social objectives, rather than shareholder value maximization (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000).  Furthermore, Chinese cross-listed firms with central 
government ownership carry the image of the government power of China, often 
overriding their business images (Cui and Jiang, 2012). As noted by prior studies, 
Chinese government controlled firms convey motivations, such as national pride, when 
they conduct businesses in foreign countries (Hope, Thomas, and Vyas, 2011). It is 
difficult for investors, the key constituents in the host market, to have positive 
perceptions of the practices of firms that are strongly associated with the Chinese 
government (He and Lyles, 2008; Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; Cui and Jiang, 2012).  
 In addition, the Chinese government-owner is different from state ownership in 
other countries because the Chinese Communist Party, as the single-ruling party, controls 
important institutions in business, media, academia, and every sphere in China (Lin, 
2013: 744). The Chinese Communist Party is ‘the real hand in the gloves of state 
ownership in China’ (Lin, 2013: 744). Although Chinese firms with central government 
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ownership are undergoing substantial reforms in their management and operations (He 
and Lyles, 2008; Cui and Jiang, 2012), U.S. investors still hold a negative view toward 
Chinese firms with central government ownership. 
U.S. investors are particularly suspicious of the Chinese central government 
because the Chinese central government is likely to use firms to fulfill social goals (Zou 
and Adams, 2008). As such, U.S. investors tend to view firms controlled by the 
government as less legitimate. Of course, this is not to imply that every investor in the 
U.S. is influenced by the overarching ideology, and perceive government ownership as 
illegitimate. Instead, I posit that whether or not investors themselves are directly 
concerned about government intervention, they recognize that other investors may 
translate their concerns into an unwillingness to invest. As a result, it is likely that 
Chinese cross-listed firms with central government ownership will be perceived as less 
legitimate by U.S. investors. This suggests the following hypothesis:      
Hypothesis 1:  Central government ownership of Chinese firms cross-
listed on the U.S. stock market is negatively related to investor perceptions 
of firm legitimacy. 
U.S. Investor Perceptions of CEO Political Connections with the Central 
Government  
 Resource dependency theory argues that political connections are a mechanism of 
influence that operates in two directions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). When executives 
have connections with the government, these connections may provide access to critical 
resources for the firm. However, this same political connection can be a mechanism 
through which the government coopts the firm in order to achieve public ends. In the U.S. 
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there is evidence that political connections provide financial benefits for firms (Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Hillman, 2005). However, political connections in China 
are qualitatively different and are likely to favor the influence of the government over the 
resource acquisition of the firm (Fan et al., 2007; Sun, Hu, and Hillman, 2015). 
A major difference between U.S. and Chinese political connections is that in the 
U.S., former government officials may be hired by private-sector firms but in China, 
government officials are often appointed to a leadership position in a state-owned 
enterprise (Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). This difference between hiring and 
appointing top managers carries over into expectations for future gain. In the U.S., a 
public-sector job provides limited prospects for financial gain but government experience 
is rewarded in the private-sector. In China, however, the future career prospects of top 
managers appointed by the government are influenced by how well the firm achieves 
social goals (Fan, Morck, and Yeung, 2011). A further difference is that the judicial 
system is highly vulnerable to political influence from the strong central government. 
This, combined with the single-party rule of the Communist party, means that the costs of 
political cooptation are likely to outweigh the benefits of political benefits associated 
with political connections (Peng, 2003). 
 U.S. investors see CEO political connections in China differently from how they 
see political connections in the U.S. Investors are likely to perceive cross-listed firms 
with politically-connected CEOs as illegitimate because of the appointment process of 
CEOs and the strong political intervention of the Chinese government, which may 
potentially decrease the value of politically-connected firms (Fan et al., 2007). This 
suggests the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 2: For Chinese firms cross-listed on the U.S. stock market, 
CEO political connections with the central government are negatively 
related to investor perceptions of firm legitimacy. 
Hong Kong Investor Perceptions of Government Ownership  
 The ideology among Hong Kong investors is very different from that among U.S. 
investors both because of different assumptions regarding the role of the government and 
because of closer social and economic ties to mainland China. As suggested by Okuno-
Fujiwara (1997), the societies of East Asian countries expect stronger intervention by the 
government in the economy. The government is perceived to play an important and 
positive role in the economy in East Asia (Wade, 1990; Lee, 2002) where the government 
is often the main resource allocation mechanism in the economy (Aoki, Kim, and Okuno-
Fujiwara, 1997), and functions as substitutes or complements of other institutional actors, 
such as markets, organizations, and intermediaries. The role of the government in East 
Asia is to help achieve an efficient allocation of resources, and create conditions that help 
to guarantee policy implementation through powers of enforcement (Lau, 1997). 
Government ownership, rather than being a rare anomaly as it is in the U.S., is seen as a 
legitimate tool of economic development in East Asian societies.  
 While U.S. investors have an ideological suspicion of the Chinese government, 
investors in Hong Kong have a strong cultural link through their shared heritage and 
culture and this link has strengthened since Hong Kong was integrated into mainland 
China under the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement that began in 1997 (Lau, 1997). 
While the laissez-faire government of Hong Kong intervenes less than the Central 
Government in China, the future economic development of Hong Kong depends on 
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further integration with mainland China. Hong Kong is considered an ideal cross-listing 
destination due to its social and cultural proximity to the mainland China (Fung, Su, and 
Gul, 2013; Pan and Brooker, 2014). As suggested by Karrenman and Van der Kanaap 
(2009), ‘the influx of mainland China affiliated shares provides a considerable 
contribution to the development of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’ (p. 571). Since the 
early 1990s, Hong Kong has been the major destination for Chinese firms (Pan and 
Brooker, 2014). A large percentage of firms listed on Hong Kong market are influenced 
by Chinese institutions. Specifically, as of the end of 2014, the Hong Kong stock market 
had 1,671 listed firms, of which 50 percent - compared to 23 percent by the end of 2001 
and less than one percent in 1991 (Ma, 2003) - were incorporated in mainland China.  
 Hong Kong investors are likely to hold a positive view on Chinese government 
ownership because of further economic integration of Hong Kong and Mainland China. 
Investors prefer to invest in familiar stocks (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Yang and 
Lau, 2006). Investors tend to perceive firms that they are familiar with as legitimate. 
State-owned firms still dominate capital markets in mainland China (Pargendler, 2012), 
although the proportion of firms with the government as controlling shareholders 
declined from 97 percent in 1997 to 75 percent in 2003, and to 60 percent in 2007 
(Liebman and Milhaupt, 2008; Pargendler, 2012). As more and more Chinese firms with 
government ownership are listed in the Hong Kong capital market, investors in the 
market become more familiar with firms having government ownership.  
 In summary, influenced by prevailing ideologies regarding the government’s role 
in East Asia, the cultural ties to mainland China, and a familiarity with government 
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ownership, investors in Hong Kong are likely to perceive firms with central government 
ownership as more legitimate. 
Hypothesis 3: Central government ownership of Chinese firms cross-listed 
on the Hong Kong stock market is positively related to investor 
perceptions of firm legitimacy. 
Hong Kong Investor Perceptions of CEO Political Connections with the Central 
Government   
 In East Asia, a firm’s competitive advantage relies on direct connections to the 
legislative branch. Hong Kong investors, influenced by prevailing ideologies that hold 
positive views on government intervention in East Asia, are likely to perceive cross-listed 
firms with politically-connected CEOs as more legitimate. 
 CEO political connections increase the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of investors. 
The institutional voids in China generate difficulty for investors to evaluate firms listed in 
such markets (Wu, Li, & Li, 2013). Thus, investors tend to rely on signals, such as firms’ 
political connections to evaluate firms (Peng, 2004; Wu et al., 2013). For instance, in 
Southeast Asia, political connections, instead of fundamentals such as productivity, are 
the primary determinants of investors’ investment decisions (Fisman, 2001). The benefits 
of political connections in China are compelling, in that the governments control a wide 
range of regulatory and financial resources (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010). Therefore, 
firms with politically-connected CEOs are likely to obtain higher levels of legitimacy 
among Hong Kong investors. 
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Hypothesis 4: For Chinese firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong stock 
market, CEO political connections with the central government are 
positively related to investor perceptions of firm legitimacy.  







 I tested the hypotheses using a sample of Chinese firms which were listed on the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen markets (A-shares) and were also cross-listed on the U.S. 
(American Depositary Receipts) or Hong Kong (H-shares) stock markets. A large number 
of cross-listed firms in the developed stock markets are from China (Pagano, Röell, and 
Zechner, 2002; Southam and Sapp, 2010). Among cross-listed firms, a large percentage 
of Chinese firms have government ownership and political connections. The Chinese 
government plays a crucial role in ‘shaping firm behavior, and in distributing 
government-controlled resources’ (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Wright, 2012: 665). A-
shares and H-shares represent the same ownership stake in the same firm (Arquette, 
Brown, and Burdekin, 2008), but are traded on separate markets. H-shares are currently 
not convertible to A-shares, and vice versa. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) of 
Chinese firm are certificates representing the underlying A-shares on the home market. 
Given that institutional environments are very different between Hong Kong and the 
U.S., using Chinese firms cross-listed on the U.S. and Hong Kong stock markets makes it 
possible to investigate whether investors in different host countries have different 
perceptions of the legitimacy of political connections. Thus, Chinese cross-listings serve
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 as a good setting to investigate foreign investor perceptions of government ownership 
and CEO political connections.  
 In order to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 regarding firm legitimacy in the 
U.S. market, I created Sample 1 which consists of firms incorporated and listed in 
mainland China and also cross-listed on the U.S. market (referred to as A-ADR sample 
hereafter). In order to test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 regarding firm legitimacy in the 
Hong Kong market, I created Sample 2 which consists of firms incorporated and listed in 
mainland China and also cross-listed on the Hong Kong market (referred to as A-H 
sample hereafter). 
 The dataset begins in 2006 and ends in 2014 to include firms after China's split-
share reform during late 2005 (Jia and Tomasic, 2010). I obtained stock price and trading 
volume of ADRs and H-shares from DataStream International. Ownership and 
accounting data for these firms were obtained from the Chinese Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. I also cross checked ownership data with 
information provided in the annual reports. After merging these databases and removing 
observations that are missing key explanatory variables, I had a sample of 58 firms cross-
listed on the U.S. market (A-ADR sample), and 84 firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong 
market (A-H sample). 
 Specifically, for the A-ADR sample (firms listed in mainland China and cross-
listed in the U.S.), I downloaded the ADR list from BNY Mellon. Since this study mainly 
focuses on cross-listings, I excluded firms that only list on the U.S. market without home-
market listings. As of January 2015, there are 75 Chinese firms issuing ADRs that also 
have corresponding A-share on home market. For each ADR-issuing firm, I collected 
30 
 
daily stock price and trading volume data from DataStream international. I excluded 17 
firms that have no trading volume data in DataStream.  
 For the A-H sample (firms listed in mainland China and cross-listed in Hong 
Kong), I downloaded the list of firms that were incorporated in mainland China and have 
issued H-share on Main Board in the Hong Kong market. I obtained an initial sample of 
186 firms that have H-share from the website of Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. I searched 
the website of each firm and checked whether they also issue A-share (i.e., list in 
mainland China). After excluding 102 firms that are not listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen markets, I obtained the final A-H sample of 84 firms that both have A-share 
and H-share. In sum, the final dataset consists of 303 firm-year observations for A-ADR 
sample, 544 firm-year observations for A-H sample. 
Measures  
Dependent Variable  
 Legitimacy is defined as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574). Firms obtain legitimacy 
when their attributes or practices are accepted by its institutional environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).   
 Prior studies examining legitimacy have used proxies such as media coverage 
(Coombs, 1992; Deephouse, 1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deephouse and Carter, 
2005; Kuilman and Li, 2009), post IPO valuation (Bell et al., 2012b), IPO price premium 
(Bell et al., 2014), and IPO underpricing (Bell et al., 2008). Researchers often use media 
data to measure legitimacy conferred by the general public. For example, Brown and 
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Deegan (1998) utilized media attention as a measure of legitimacy. The level of media 
attention is calculated as the number of print media newspapers and journals relating to 
the environment. Coombs (1992) used the Washington Post and the New York Times to 
measure the legitimacy of President Ronald Reagan’s Task Force on Food Assistance. 
Hybels, Ryan, and Barley (1994) used business periodical abstracts to indicate the 
legitimacy of biotechnology firms. Kuilman and Li (2009) measured legitimacy by public 
acceptance, which is measured as the number of reports in the Times of London and in 
the New York Times in two years.  
 Studies on capital markets have used IPO data and market valuation to measure 
firm legitimacy. For example, Bell and colleagues (2008) examined the influence of 
country of origin on foreign IPO legitimacy. They measured IPO legitimacy by foreign 
IPO underpricing (i.e., the difference between the stock’s closing price on the first day of 
trading and the initially offered price). Bell et al. (2014) used a legitimacy framework to 
examine investor perceptions of foreign IPO value. They used price premium as a 
measure of investor perceptions. Price premium is computed as the difference between 
offering price and net tangible book value per share after offering divided by offering 
price. Bell et al. (2012b) examined the relationship between investor protection and firm 
legitimacy perceived by U.S. investors. They used four financial indicators as a measure 
of IPO success and firm legitimacy: pre-money market valuation, net proceeds of the IPO 
offerings, the 90-day and 180-day post IPO valuation. Paruchuri and Misangyi (2015) 
studied investor perceptions of firms’ financial misconduct, and examine market 
valuations for firms following restatement events. The authors measured market 
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valuation by the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (calculated as the sum of the 
abnormal daily returns of each firm over the event window). 
 I utilized trading volume as a measure of firm legitimacy for both conceptual and 
practical considerations. Conceptually speaking, the level of organizational legitimacy in 
the host market is related to investors’ trading activity. Legitimacy is a ‘multidimensional 
concept linked to a variety of stakeholders’ (Deephouse and Carter, 2005: 336). Prior 
studies have examined legitimacy from perspectives of the general public and 
government regulators (e.g., Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). For 
example, Deephouse and Carter (2005) measured regulatory legitimacy using federal 
government’s regulatory ratings, and measured public legitimacy using content analysis 
of local newspapers. In this study I examine organizational legitimacy from the market 
investors’ perspective. Given that organizational legitimacy is the endorsement by key 
social actors (Deephouse, 1996), investors, as a key relevant social actor, have the 
standing to confer organizational legitimacy. In addition, higher levels of legitimacy 
means a larger number of investors are interested in and willing to purchase the stock. 
Trading volume reflects the number of investors and the amount of information. As 
suggested by Sabherwal (2007), trading volume is directly related to the mass of traders 
in the market. Trading volume is dependent on how many potential investors are willing 
to trade stocks. Large trading volume indicates there are a large number of investors 
interested in purchasing the firm’s stock. New information about a firm also drives 
trading volume but I can control for the amount of information driving trading volume by 
including the trading volume in the Chinese market as a control. 
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 Practically speaking, trading volume captures different variations of 
organizational legitimacy over time and across capital markets. Since this study seeks to 
capture the change of organizational legitimacy corresponding to firm-level factors over 
time, IPO price measures cannot be used for this study because they are one-time 
measures. In addition, this study attempts to capture different associations between state 
involvement in corporate governance and firm legitimacy across international capital 
markets. Domestic A-share and cross-listed H-share represent the same ownership stake 
in the same firm, but A-share can only be traded in mainland Chinese market while H-
share is traded in Hong Kong market. Because of market segmentation, trading volume 
reflects investor perceptions in each market. 
 In sum, trading volume reflects investor acceptance (Lee, 2001) and provides an 
indicator of investors' interest (Sabherwal, 2007) and demand for the stock (Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003). Therefore, I used trading volume of ADRs and H-shares associated with 
Chinese cross-listed firms to measure the level of organizational legitimacy in the U.S. 
and Hong Kong capital markets. As suggested by Scott (1994: 35), absolute trading 
volume, instead of relative trading volume (i.e., the annual trading volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding), is ‘a better indicator of the number of investors seeking 
information.’ Therefore, I used the absolute trading volume to capture investors’ interests 
in the firm. I calculated dollar volume, using the total number of shares traded multiplied 
by the stock price (James and Edmister 1983; Lo and Wang, 2000). Dollar volume_ADR 




 I used the period between April 1st of the current year and March 31st of the next 
year to compute the trading volume measure. I chose this time period because the annual 
reports of Chinese firms are usually released by the end of March. For example, for the 
fiscal year 2010, the annual report is often released in March, 2011. Hence, 
corresponding to the financial and corporate governance information in fiscal year 2010, 
I computed dollar volume based on data from April 1st 2011 through March 31st 2012. I 
assume that investors’ knowledge of the governance characteristics is based on 
information disclosed in the annual report. 
Independent Variables 
Since the hypotheses pertain to investor perception of organizational legitimacy, it 
has to be plausible that investors have awareness of the particular characteristics. In this 
study, central government ownership and CEO political connections, are salient among 
investors, because information regarding changes of ownership and CEO’s profiles are 
documented in the annual report released to investors. Government ownership and CEO 
political connections influence investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in the host market. 
The perception of firm legitimacy affects investors' investment decision, trading behavior 
and ultimately trading volume in the host market.  
 Following Luo and colleagues (2016), central government ownership is measured 
by a dummy, coded as one if the central government or its agencies are the dominant 
shareholder, and zero otherwise. I obtained detailed information on shareholders from the 
CSMAR database. Chinese public firms are required to disclose the identity of ten largest 
shareholders and the number of shares owned in the annual reports.  
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  CEO political connections, coded as Political connection_central gov, is 
measured by a dummy variable, which equals to one if the CEO is a former officer of the 
central government (Fan et al., 2007; Li and Qian, 2013; Liang et al., 2015). I obtained 
the CEO’s profile from the ‘Profile of Directors and Senior Managers’ section of the 
annual report.  
Control Variables 
 I controlled for firm characteristics, corporate-governance factors, and other 
related factors that may influence investors’ perception and trading activities. For firm-
level factors, I controlled for firm performance, cross-listing age, market capitalization, 
foreign ownership, and the percentage of non-tradable shares. For corporate-governance 
factors, I controlled for board independence, CEO duality, and managerial incentive pay. 
In addition, I controlled for industry, year, A-H-ADR dummy and stock exchanges. 
 Firm Performance. Firms with greater financial resources and better firm 
performance are likely to be perceived as more legitimate. Therefore, I controlled for 
firm performance. I used Tobins_Q and Return on Assets (ROA, calculated as net income 
divided by total assets) as measures of firm performance. 
 Firm Age. Investors are likely to view firms with a longer history as more 
legitimate (Bell et al., 2012a). Therefore, I expect that cross-listing age will influence the 
firm’s visibility, which in turn will influence firm legitimacy. In this sense, cross-listed 
firms that have a longer history will be viewed as more legitimate by foreign-market 
investors. Cross-listing age is measured by the number of years since the firm cross-listed 
on the host market (Sabherwal, 2007). For A-ADR sample, I measured cross-listing age 
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as the number of years after issuing ADRs. For A-H sample, I measured cross-listing age 
as the number of years after issuing H-shares.  
 Market Capitalization. Firms with larger-capitalization often have more active 
trading (Lo and Wang, 2000). Thus, I controlled for the market capitalization of the firm. 
Market capitalization for each stock is calculated as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by its closing price per share.  
 In addition, I also controlled for foreign ownership (the percentage of shares 
owned by foreign individuals and firms), and the percentage of non-tradable shares. 
Shares in the Chinese capital market are divided into non-tradable shares and tradable 
shares. Non-tradable shares cannot be traded on stock exchanges, and can only be 
transferred by private sale, which in most cases requires government approval.  
I controlled for corporate governance factors because the quality of corporate 
governance may influence firms’ future prospects and investor perceptions of the firm. 
Thus, firms’ corporate governance practices are likely to influence investors’ trading 
behavior. I controlled for board independence (Boon, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007), 
CEO duality (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, and Weintrop, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), 
and CEO stock options (Bell et al., 2014).  
 Board Independence. Board independence is measured as a ratio calculated as the 
number of independent directors divided by the number of total board members. Board 
independence serves as one of the most important governance indicators when foreign-
market investors evaluate the cross-listed firms (Bell et al., 2012b; Moore et al., 2012). 
Investors in the U.S. market prefer boards consisting of at least half independent directors 
(Moore et al., 2012). Therefore, cross-listed firms will be viewed as more legitimate by 
37 
 
foreign-market investors if they have more independent directors on their boards. In this 
sense, a greater percentage of independent directors are associated with greater 
legitimacy. Therefore, I controlled for board independence. CEO stock options are 
controlled in the analysis. CEO stock option is a dummy variable, which is coded as 1 if 
CEO has stock option and zero if not. I also controlled for CEO duality, which is coded 
as 1 if CEO is also the Chairman of the Boards, and zero if not. 
In addition, there are several other factors that may influence the attractiveness of 
ADRs and H-shares. It is likely that different trading volumes across firms are partly 
impacted by industry membership. For example, U.S. investors may be optimistic about 
the prospects for firms in the technology industry (Arquette et al., 2008), while Hong 
Kong investors may be more interested in industrial goods (BNY Mellon, 2015). Thus, 
industry dummies are added in this study in order to control for the effect of industry on 
trading volume. To control for a potential time effect, I included year dummy variables in 
the analysis. Firms cross-listed on the U.S. stock exchanges are assigned one while firms 
cross-listed over the counter are assigned zero. Trading volume of ADRs and H-share 
will also be influenced by the trading volume of corresponding A-share in mainland 
China. Therefore, I controlled for Dollar volume_A, calculated as the log of trading 
volume of A-share. Additionally, I controlled for A-H-ADR dummy, which equals to one 
if the firm is both cross-listed in the U.S. and Hong Kong markets, and zero otherwise. 
Analysis   
 The dataset consists of unbalanced panels of observations because not all of the 
firms have observations in every year of the panel. The two independent variables of 
interest were central government controlling interest and the political connection of CEO 
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to the central government. There is significant cross-sectional variance in these variables 
but much less change over the time-frame of my study. Specifically, only 13 firms have 
changed their central government ownership, and 3 firms have changed their CEO 
political connections to the central government. Since a fixed-effects model would only 
allow the analysis of within-firm variation in these variables, I estimated a random-effect 
model with maximum likelihood estimator allowing me to observe cross-sectional effects 
of political connections while addressing the non-independence of repeated observations 
of the same firm. I lagged all independent and control variables (except for the dollar 
volume of A-share) by one year. To assess the potential threat of collinearity, I computed 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs), and found a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
1.60 and a maximum VIF of 3.85 for A-ADR sample, and a mean VIF of 1.39 and a 
maximum VIF of 2.73 for A-H sample, well below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Hair 






Table 2 and Table 3 present descriptive statistics and correlations for A-ADR 
sample and A-H sample respectively. Table 4 displays the model results for A-ADR 
sample and A-H sample. I conducted regressions in two steps. First, I included control 
variables in the model (Model 1 and 3 in Table 4). Second, I ran the full model (Model 2 
and 4) by including both independent variables (i.e., central government ownership and 
CEO political connections).  
 --------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
    ----------------------------------------------------- 
 It is interesting to note that trading volume among Chinese A-shares is a stronger 
and more significant predictor of trading volume in Hong Kong (β = 0.436) than in the 
US (β = 0.208). This reflects the strong geographic, political and cultural ties between the 
Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets. The influence of market capitalization is nearly 
identical in both markets. Finally, the A-H-ADR dummy reveals something interesting 
about the influence of cross-listing on legitimacy. In the U.S. market, firms that are also 
cross-listed in Hong Kong are less legitimate (β = -0.825) though this effect is not 
statistically significant. In the Hong Kong market, firms that are also cross-listed in the 




Hypothesis 1 predicts that central government ownership of firms cross-listed on 
the U.S. market is negatively associated with investor perceptions of firm legitimacy. 
According to the results of Model 2 (using A-ADR sample, the U.S. market), the 
coefficient of central government ownership is significant (β= -0.623, p < 0.05). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. In Hypothesis 2, I posit a negative association 
between CEO political connections and firm legitimacy. Model 2 (using A-ADR sample, 
the U.S. market) in Table 4 demonstrates that CEO political connections are positively 
associated with legitimacy (β= 0.984, p < 0.05). The sign of the coefficient is opposite to 
my argument. As such, Hypothesis 2 is not supported since it is not in the direction that I 
predicted. These effects are economically significant. Since the dependent variable is the 
natural log of trading volume, the coefficient value of -0.623 means that a firm with 
controlling interest by the central government would have 46 percent less trading volume. 
The coefficient value of 0.984 means that a firm with a CEO that is a former central 
government official would have 170 percent more trading volume. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive association between central government 
ownership of firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong market and investor perceptions of 
firm legitimacy. The coefficient for central government ownership in Model 4 (Table 4) 
is positively significant at p < 0.01 level, supporting Hypothesis 3 (β=0.245). This 
coefficient corresponds to a 27 percent increase in trading volume for firms with central 
government controlling interest. Hypothesis 4 argues that for firms cross-listed on the 
Hong Kong stock market, CEO political connections are positively related to investor 
perceptions of firm legitimacy. According to the results of Model 4 in Table 4, CEO 
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political connections are positively associated with firm legitimacy (β=0.592, p < 0.01 for 
the A-H sample, Hong Kong market). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported. This 
coefficient corresponds to an 81 percent increase in trading volume for a firm with a 
former central government official as CEO. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
    ----------------------------------------------------- 
Post-hoc Analysis 
 To gain additional insights, I conducted four sets of post-hoc analyses in this 
section. First, in order to check whether there are important differences between firms 
that cross-listed in Hong Kong, the U.S., and both markets, I tested hypotheses using the 
A-H-ADR sample (the subsample of firms listed in both Hong Kong and the U.S.) and 
the A-H-only sample (the subsample of firms listed in Hong Kong but not in the U.S.). In 
the second post-hoc section, I checked alternative measures of two independent variables. 
In addition, I tested potential interaction effects between central government ownership 
and CEO political connections. Finally, I estimated some alternate model specifications. 
Post-hoc Section 1: Test Hypotheses using A-H-ADR sample and A-H-only sample 
 To check whether there are important differences between firms that listed only 
in Hong Kong and firms that listed in both Hong Kong and the U.S., I tested hypotheses 
using the A-H-ADR sample and the A-H-only sample. The A-H-ADR sample includes 
firms that were cross-listed in both markets. Among 58 firms cross-listed on the U.S. 
market (the A-ADR sample) and 84 firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong market (the A-
H sample), I found 52 firms cross-listed on both the U.S. and Hong Kong markets (the A-
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H-ADR sample). The final dataset consists of 274 firm-year observations (52 firms) for 
the A-H-ADR sample. 
The results of control models and full models using the A-H-ADR sample are 
presented in Table 5. Tests utilized the same analytic techniques used in hypotheses 
testing. The results in Table 5 show that conclusions about the effects of ownership and 
political connections in the U.S. are consistent in the overlap subsample. According to the 
results of Model 6, the coefficient of central government ownership is negatively 
significant (β= - 0.787, p < 0.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported, which is 
consistent with my findings when using the A-ADR sample. According to the results of 
Model 6 in Table 5, the coefficient of CEO political connections is positive and 
significant (β=1.150, p < 0.01), consistent with findings when I used the A-ADR sample.  
In the Hong Kong market, CEO political connections are positively related to firm 
legitimacy (β=0.471, p < 0.01, Model 8 in Table 5), which is consistent with findings 
using the A-H sample. However, the coefficient of central government ownership is not 
significant when I used the overlap sub-sample, which indicates some differences in 
firms only listed in Hong Kong and firms listed in both markets. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
To better understand firms that are only cross-listed in Hong Kong, I conducted 
another post-hoc analysis using the A-H-only sample. The A-H-only sample includes 
firms that were not cross-listed in the U.S., but only cross-listed in the Hong Stock 
market. Among 84 firms (544 firm-year observations) cross-listed on the Hong Kong 
market (the A-H sample), I found 60 firms cross-listed only in the Hong Kong market. 
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The final dataset consists of 270 firm-year observations for the A-H-only sample, about 
50 percent of observations compared to the A-H sample.  
Using the A-H-only sample I tested Hypothesis 3 and 4 regarding investor 
perceptions of legitimacy in Hong Kong. Model 2 in Table 6 tested the positive effects of 
central government ownership and CEO political connections on legitimacy. I found a 
significant and positive effect of central government ownership on legitimacy among 
Hong Kong investors (β=0.406, p < 0.01), providing support for Hypothesis 3. However, 
I found a nonsignificant and positive relationship between CEO political connections and 
legitimacy (β=1.072).  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
In general, the results of using the A-H-ADR sample and the A-H-only sample are 
very similar compared to the A-ADR and the A-H sample. It is noteworthy that, even 
when the sample is limited to firms that are listed in all three markets (Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and U.S.) the effect of central government ownership is more negative in the 
U.S. than in Hong Kong, a finding that is consistent with my claim of a strong ideological 
difference between the two markets.  
In addition, the differences in the coefficient for central government ownership in 
the Hong Kong market among the A-H sample, the A-H-only sample, and the A-H-ADR 
sample indicate some differences in firms cross-listed in both markets and firms only 
cross-listed in Hong Kong. Table 7 and 8 report the means, standard deviations, and 
correlation coefficients of the variables in the A-H-ADR sample and the A-H-only 
sample. According to the means reported in Table 7 and 8, I found several meaningful 
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differences between firms cross-listed in both markets and firms only cross-listed in 
Hong Kong. I expected that firms with central government control would be less likely to 
cross-list in the U.S. However, according to the descriptive statistics in Table 7 and 8, I 
found that among firms cross-listed both in the U.S. and Hong Kong markets, a much 
higher percentage of firms have central government control (51.5%) compared to 32.2% 
of observations among firms that were only cross-listed in Hong Kong. In addition, firms 
only cross-listed in Hong Kong have a much lower percentage of CEO political 
connections (0.7%) compared to 8% of observations among firms cross-listed in both 
markets. The insignificant findings about CEO political connections using the A-H-only 
sample may be caused by small within and between firm variances (only 1 firm has CEO 
political connections to the central government). In the A-H-only sample, I only found 1 
firm (2 observations) (out of 60 firms with 270 firm-year observations) that has CEO 
political connections to the central government. In other words, firms listed in both 
markets have much stronger government involvement than firms that were cross-listed 
only in Hong Kong.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 and 8 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Post-hoc Section 2: Alternative Measures of Central Government Ownership and CEO 
Political Connections 
 I also conducted a post-hoc analysis using a number of alternative measures of 
government ownership and political connections. I tested the following alternative 
measures of government ownership: state_ownership_pct and controller_central_pct. 
State_ownership_pct is calculated as the percentage of share ownership by the 
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government, including central and local governments and agencies (Delios, Wu, and 
Zhou, 2006; Pan et al., 2013). Controller_central_pct is the percentage of shares owned 
by the central government when the central government is the largest shareholder.  
In addition, I tested the following alternative measures of managerial political 
connections: ceo_gov_rank, ceo_npc, ceo_cppcc, and ceo_communist. I obtained CEO’s 
profile from the ‘Profile of Directors and Senior Managers’ section of the annual report. 
Ceo_gov_rank is a rank order of CEO political connections. The range of ceo_gov_rank 
is from zero to eight. If CEO is not a former official at any level of government agencies, 
then ceo_gov_rank is coded as 0. If CEO was former officer with chief position in the 
central government, then ceo_gov_rank is coded as 8. Assistant position in the central 
government is coded as 7, chief position in the provincial government coded as 6, 
assistant position in the provincial government coded as 5, chief position at the bureau 
level coded as 4, assistant position at the bureau level coded as 3, chief position at the 
county level equals to 2, and assistant position at the county level is coded as 1. Ceo_npc 
is a dummy variable. If CEO is a current or former member of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the legislative body in China, then ceo_npc is coded as 1, and zero 
otherwise. Ceo_cppcc is also a dummy. If CEO is a current or former member of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory board for the 
Chinese government, then ceo_cppcc is coded as 1, and zero otherwise (Fan et al., 2007; 
Li and Qian, 2013; Liang et al., 2015). Ceo_communist is a dummy variable. If CEO is a 
member of the communist party, then ceo_communist equals to 1, and zero if not.  
Alternative Measures for A-H Model 
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Table 9 reports descriptive statistics and correlations among alternative measures 
of central government ownership and CEO political connections for A-H model. For A-H 
sample, controller_central_dummy is highly correlated with alternative measures. In 
addition, two alternative measures of government ownership are also significantly 
correlated with each other. The average of controller_central_dummy is 41.9%, which 
means over forty percent of firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong stock exchanges are 
controlled by the central government.  
 With regards to alternative measures of CEO political connections, 
ceo_gov_central is significantly correlated with ceo_gov_rank, ceo_npc, and ceo_cppcc, 
but not significantly correlated with ceo_communist. Among alternative measures of 
CEO political connections, ceo_communist is not significantly correlated with 
ceo_gov_rank  and ceo_npc. ceo_communist is negatively correlated with ceo_cppcc, 
because a large number of cppcc members are members of non-communist party, such as 
China Zhi Gong Party, Jiu San Society, China Association for Promoting Democracy, 
National Construction Association, and Democratic League. ceo_gov_central, ceo_npc 
and ceo_gov_rank are highly correlated (correlation coefficients are greater than 0.5), 
which indicates that CEO who was officer at a higher level is often a member of NPC, 
having large influence on policy making. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
The results of post-hoc analyses regarding the effect of government ownership 
using alternative measures on investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in Hong Kong are 
presented in Table 10. Tests utilized the same analytic techniques used in hypotheses 
testing. When using controller_central_pct as a measure of government ownership, 
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results are consistent with those found from hypotheses testing using central government 
ownership dummy as a measure. Hypothesis 3 are supported (β = 0.490, p < 0.01). When 
government ownership is measured by state_ownership_pct, the coefficient for 
state_ownership_pct is positive but not significant. The nonsignificant findings when 
using the percentage of state ownership as a measure may be explained by the fact that 
market investors tend to be more sensitive to the nature of the controlling shareholder, 
instead of the exact number of the percentage. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
The results of post-hoc analyses regarding the effect of CEO political connections 
using alternative measures on investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in Hong Kong are 
presented in Table 11. Post-hoc analysis was conducted to investigate whether the 
findings from hypotheses testing regarding CEO political connections were sensitive to 
the measurement of variables. Results of post-hoc analyses were in agreement that 
Hypothesis 4 was supported except for ceo_cppcc measure. Table 12 is a summary of 
alternative measures and corresponding findings.   
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 and Table 12 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
Alternative Measures for A-ADR Model 
Table 13 reports descriptive statistics and correlations among alternative measures 
of central government ownership and CEO political connections for A-ADR model. 
Consistent with findings for A-H sample, For A-ADR sample controller_central_dummy 
is significantly correlated to alternative measures of government ownership. The average 
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state_ownership_pct is 56.5% for A-ADR sample, and 53.2% for A-H sample. 
Controller_central_pct is 27.5% for A-ADR sample and 20.0% for A-H sample.  
With regards to alternative measures of CEO political connections, the majority 
alternative measures of political connections are significantly correlated except for 
ceo_communist. Specifically, ceo_communist is not significantly correlated with 
ceo_gov_rank and ceo_npc. The average of ceo_npc is 12% for A-ADR sample and 7% 
for A-H sample. The average of ceo_communist and ceo_gov_rank are also higher for A-
ADR sample. As such, I may conclude that relatively speaking firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. have stronger CEO political connections. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 13 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
The results of post-hoc analyses regarding the effect of government ownership 
using alternative measures on investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in the U.S. 
(Hypothesis 1) are presented in Table 14. None of the alternative measures provide 
support for the hypothesized relationships in post-hoc analyses. When government 
ownership is measured by controller_central_pct, the coefficient is very close to that of 
central government ownership dummy. However, the percentage measure is not 
significant, which may indicate that market investors are likely to be more sensitive to the 
largest shareholder instead of the percentage of shares.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
The results of post-hoc analyses regarding the effect of CEO political connections 
using alternative measures on investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in the U.S. 
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(Hypothesis 2) are presented in Table 15. Among four alternative measures, ceo_npc and 
ceo_cppcc are significant (β = 0.717, p < 0.1; β = 0.995, p < 0.05). However, the 
direction is opposite to my argument. Coefficients for ceo_gov_rank and ceo_communist 
are positive and nonsignificant. Therefore, none of the alternative measures provide 
supporting results. Table 16 is a summary of alternative measures and corresponding 
findings. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 15 and 16 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
Post-hoc Section 3: Potential Interaction Effects  
I further conducted post-hoc analysis to investigate whether government 
ownership and CEO political connections complementarily affect legitimacy. When firms 
have both central government ownership and CEO political connections, strategies made 
by top managers lead by politically-connected CEO are more likely to be consistent with 
government goals. Given that Hong Kong investors have positive views on state 
involvement in corporate governance because of shared culture and close economic 
linkage, such firms are likely to obtain higher level of legitimacy among Hong Kong 
investors. In other words, central government ownership and CEO political connections 
are expected to have complementary effects in Hong Kong. 
Hypothesis 5: Central government ownership and CEO political 
connections complementarily affect investor perceptions of firm 
legitimacy. The presence of CEO political connections will strengthen the 
positive relationship between central government ownership and 
legitimacy among Hong Kong investors. 
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Similarly, when firms have both central government ownership and CEO political 
connections, government has two mechanisms through which (ownership mechanism and 
top managers lead by politically-connected CEO) government could intervene corporate 
governance. Given that U.S. investors have negative views on state involvement in 
corporate governance, such firms are likely to obtain much lower level of legitimacy 
among U.S. investors. In other words, the presence of CEO political connections will 
strengthen the negative association between central government ownership and investor 
perceptions of legitimacy in the U.S. 
Hypothesis 6: Central government ownership and CEO political 
connections complementarily affect investor perceptions of firm 
legitimacy. The presence of CEO political connections will strengthen the 
negative relationship between central government ownership and 
legitimacy among U.S. investors. 
 To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, I generated the interaction term controller_dum * 
ceo_gov utilizing central government ownership dummy as a measure of government 
ownership and CEO_central gov dummy as a measure of political connections. 
Hypothesis 5 regarding the complementary effects of state ownership and political 
connections on legitimacy in Hong Kong was tested in Model 4 in Table 17. The results 
of interaction terms controller_dum * ceo_gov was nonsignificant. Hypothesis 6 was 
tested in Model 2 in Table 17, which assessed the complementary effects of state 
ownership and political connections on legitimacy in the U.S. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive and nonsignificant, which indicates that government 
ownership and CEO political connections may have separate mechanism of influence on 
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legitimacy in the foreign market. In the post-hoc analysis, I did not find any significant 
interaction effect between two forms of government involvement. 
Post-hoc Section 4: Model Specifications 
The commonly used approaches to estimate population parameters from a random 
sample are maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator. The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is the standard 
random-effects regression estimator (use xtreg, re option in stata). The GMM estimator 
produces a matrix-weighted average of the within and between estimators. The Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator (MLE) maximizes the likelihood of the random-effects regression 
model. GMM estimator and ML estimator are different estimators for the random effects 
regression. The mle and re option in stata yield essentially similar results except when the 
total observations are less than 200 (Stata, 2013). Both MLE and GMM estimators 
provide consistent results for large complete data sets. However, for small sample 
designs, the MLE option is better because the estimated variance is smaller and the 
parameter estimates are more precise. Therefore, in the previous method section, I 
utilized ML random-effects regression estimator (use xtreg, mle option in stata). 
According to the results of random-effects GLS regression presented in Table 18, 
the coefficient estimates provide consistent support for Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4. Model 4 
demonstrated that central government ownership and CEO political connections 
positively affect legitimacy among Hong Kong investors (β = 0.245, p < 0.01; β = 0.592, 
p < 0.01). Compared to the estimates in Model 4 Table 4 using maximum likelihood 
estimators, the coefficients are very close, and standard errors are slightly different. 
Model 2 in Table 18 showed that central government ownership negatively influence 
52 
 
investor perceptions of legitimacy in the U.S. (β =  - 0.625, p < 0.1). The coefficient for 
the central government ownership in Model 2 Table 4 is also positively significant (β = - 
0.623, p < 0.05). According to Table 4 and Table 18, I may conclude that random effects 
ML estimator and GMM estimator provide similar results in my dataset.  
Fixed effects (firm-specific heterogeneity) 
Firms may differ over time in a consistent manner that is unobserved. If 
unobserved variables are fixed over time and affect the dependent variable, the estimates 
may be biased (Certo and Semadeni, 2006; Greene, 2008). In my sample firm-specific 
heterogeneity may exist. Therefore, I ran models using fe option in stata, and checked 
whether results are largely different from random effects models. Table 19 presents 
results using fixed effects regressions,  providing similar coefficient estimates. Model 4 
demonstrated that in Hong Kong market, central government ownership and CEO 
political connections are positively related to legitimacy, providing support for 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 (β = 0.194, p < 0.1; β = 0.466, p < 0.1). Fixed effects model also 
provided similar estimates for investor perceptions of legitimacy in the U.S.  
Among firms that were cross-listed in the U.S. or Hong Kong stock market, 
within-firm variances are very small. Specifically, the majority firms in the sample have 
no variance in central government ownership and CEO political connections. Only 13 
firms have some variances in government ownership and 3 firms have variances in CEO 
political connections during the periods between 2006 and 2014. However, there is much 
larger cross-sectional variance in these variables, and thus random effects model is more 






The Chinese economy is the second largest in the world. As it grows to become 
the largest in the world, its capital market must eventually be integrated with the other 
major economies in the world. This means that foreign investors will have the same 
access to Chinese companies as they have to German, U.S. or Japanese companies and 
will, therefore, have to evaluate and value the corporate governance of these firms. State 
involvement in corporate governance, through government ownership and CEO 
appointments of government officials, is a common practice in China but a practice that 
is unique to China. I have argued that the legitimacy of this practice is influenced by the 
ideology and that this ideology varies significantly around the world, most notable 
between the U.S. and Hong Kong.  
My results demonstrate that government ownership and CEO political 
connections do affect the legitimacy of Chinese firms listed on foreign markets but not 
exactly in the way that I expected. The central government ownership has a strong 
negative impact on perceived legitimacy in the U.S. and a smaller positive effect on 
perceived legitimacy in Hong Kong. U.S. investors are wary of government ownership in 
general and are particularly suspicious of the Chinese government. Hong Kong investors, 
on the other hand, have stronger cultural, social and economic ties to the Chinese 
mainland and appear more optimistic about the benefits of government ownership. This
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 result is the clearest demonstration of the ideological differences embedded in the two 
exchanges. Despite the fact that government ownership is perceived negatively in the US, 
a higher number of firms in the U.S. have central government control than firms cross-
listed only in Hong Kong. As demonstrated by the descriptive statistics, central 
government is the largest controlling shareholder in 52 percent of the firms cross-listed in 
the United States and 42 percent of the firms cross-listed in Hong Kong. These findings 
are actually consistent with Pan and Brooker’s (2014) findings. The Chinese government 
plays a crucial role in directing the location pattern of Chinese firms’ foreign listings. In 
order to create national prestige, the Chinese government encourages firms to list on 
foreign markets, especially New York. 
The differences in ideology was not seen in the effect of CEO political 
connections on legitimacy. Since most firms in China began as state-owned enterprises, it 
is common in China for CEOs to be former government officials. However, only eight 
percent of the firms listed in the U.S. and four percent of the firms listed in Hong Kong 
have a CEO who is a former official with the central government. I anticipated that these 
political connections would be perceived positively in Hong Kong but negatively in the 
U.S. However, my results show a strong positive effect in both markets. A political 
connection to the Chinese government may make the firm more open to political 
manipulation at the expense of shareholders. On the other hand, a political connection 
may also provide the firm with access to the information, resources and influence of the 
government. I hypothesized that U.S. investors would focus on the negative aspects of 
this connection while Hong Kong investors focused on the potential benefits. Instead, my 
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 This study makes three contributions to the literature. The first contribution of this 
study is the demonstration that ideology is an important component of the host country 
institutional environment. Thus, I extend institutional theory by suggesting that firm-level 
attributes may be perceived differently because of different ideologies dominant in 
international capital markets. Prior studies such as Bell et al. (2014) used foreign firms 
from multiple home countries to examine their legitimacy in the U.S. host market. My 
study, however, examines institutional differences (ideologies regarding government) 
across different host country institutional environments. My study demonstrates that 
cross-listed firms are exposed to different institutional pressures in each capital market 
where the firm is listed. The legitimacy of state involvement in corporate governance 
varies across different host country institutional environments. Institutions in each host 
market are shaped through the unique processes of social constructions (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999). This study extends institutional theory by explaining differential effects of 
state involvement on firm legitimacy in host markets where prevailing ideologies 
regarding government is different. In the host countries where government intervention is 
rare, and market efficiency is secured by the strong rule of law, the dominant ideologies 
hold a negative view on government intervention. Foreign firms with central government 
ownership in such host country institutional environments are likely to face ideology 
conflict and have a lower level of legitimacy. In contrast, in host counties where leading 
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ideologies expect government intervention in business, ownership by the central 
government is positively related to legitimacy. 
 I also expand the literature on corporate governance by exploring the perceived 
legitimacy of CEO political ties to the central government. To my knowledge, no prior 
studies have examined how CEO political ties to the central government influence 
organizational legitimacy as perceived by investors. Recent studies investigating the 
effect of corporate governance on organizational legitimacy have mainly focused on 
governance mechanisms that are common in the U.S. market, such as board 
independence and managerial incentives. In contrast to prior studies, I examine the 
influence of state involvement in corporate governance, which are not well understood in 
the U.S. Contrary to my expectations, CEO political ties increase the legitimacy of cross-
listed firms regardless of whether the ideology of the host market. I argued that, for U.S. 
investors, the cooption of government-appointed CEOs would outweigh potential benefits 
of better access to government resources. However, I found that investors in the U.S. and 
Hong Kong, both favor companies that have CEOs who were former government 
officials.  
 Finally, I extend the scope of research on government-business relationships. 
State involvement in corporate governance, an important aspect of government-business 
relationships, has received limited attention in management literature (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010). Prior studies examining the government’s role in business (e.g., Shaffer, 1995; 
Russo, 2001) often emphasize government as a regulator, and investigate how 
government policies influence an organization. For example, Shaffer (1995) examined 
the effect of government policies on the competitive environment of the firm. However, 
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in addition to regulatory role, the government also interacts with corporations in many 
other ways. This study examines the role of state involvement in corporate governance 
through central government ownership and CEO political connections. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has several limitations, which offer opportunities for future 
researchers. This study is based on empirical analysis of Chinese firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. and Hong Kong. I only study firms incorporated in one country, which may limit the 
generalizability of the results to some other contexts. My findings may be more 
applicable to firms originated from emerging economies, where the government plays a 
strong role in the economy and market institutions are relatively weak. 
 In addition, this study only examines the influence of CEO political connections 
with the central government. Future studies can explore how foreign investors perceive 
political connections of the Chairman of the board. In many Chinese firms, the most 
powerful position is the Chair, equivalent to the combined CEO/Chairman position in the 
U.S. (Chen et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2016). It would be interesting to compare the 
influence of Chair’s political connections on legitimacy in different capital markets, and 
compare the influence of CEO’s and Chair’s political connections with central 
government. 
 This study only focuses on the main associations between political ties to the 
central government and firm legitimacy. Future studies can examine the potential 
moderators that may mitigate the negative influence of government ownership on 
investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in the U.S. For example, future research may 
explore potential moderators such as industry regulations, overseas education background 
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of the CEO, managerial ownership, and so forth. Industry regulation refers to ‘the extent 
to which governments supervise a specific industry’ (Wu et al., 2013: 1096). I may 
predict that the negative relationship between government ownership and firm legitimacy 
will be stronger in highly regulated industries, such as natural public utilities, natural 
resources, real estate, and finance. In addition, I may also check the moderating role of 
overseas education background of the CEO. It is very likely that CEO’s foreign education 
background can help to improve investor perceptions of the firm to some extent. Further, 
cross-listed firms may improve investor perceptions of firm legitimacy in foreign capital 
markets by employing good corporate governance practices, such as managerial 
ownership. High level of managerial ownership may serve as a signal of good governance 
practices, which are likely to associate with high level of legitimacy in foreign capital 
markets (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Bell et al., 2008). Therefore, it would be very 
interesting to investigate the interaction effect of managerial ownership and government 
ownership, and check whether high level of managerial ownership can improve investor 






This study expands of the obstacles that firms face when accessing international 
financial markets. While prior work has mostly focused on the foreign IPOs, my study 
showed that the foreign investors’ perceptions of legitimacy influence investment 
decisions long after the initial public offering. In addition, my study showed that some 
governance characteristics are perceived differently by investors in different institutional 
contexts. While I am surprised that CEOs that were former government officials had a 
positive effect on legitimacy in both the Hong Kong and United States market, my results 
did show that government ownership was perceived positively in Hong Kong but 
negatively in the United States. My findings need to be interpreted in light of some 
limitations. The segmentation of the Chinese stock market from the U.S. and Hong Kong 
markets is a unique situation and I expect this segmentation to decrease over time as the 
Chinese capital market becomes more integrated with the global economy. I also 
recognize that my measures of government ownership and political connections are 
somewhat exploratory. In contrast to measures of board independence and institutional 
ownership that are used in studies of U.S. firms, the governance characteristics of 
Chinese firms are not as standardized nor as well understood by U.S. investors. I hope 
that this study will motivate further exploration of how government involvement in 
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Independent Variable Dependent Variable Relationship 
H1 Central government ownership Organizational legitimacy 
in the U.S. stock market 
 
Negative 
H2 CEO political connections Organizational legitimacy 
in the U.S. stock market 
 
Negative 
H3 Central government ownership Organizational legitimacy 




H4 CEO political connections Organizational legitimacy 










TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for A-ADR Sample
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Dollar volume_ADR 16.62 3.72 1.00
2. Central government ownership 0.52 0.50 0.08 1.00
3. Political connection_central gov 0.08 0.27 -0.07 -0.18 1.00
4. Foreign ownership 0.93 5.20 0.02 0.04 -0.05 1.00
5. Non-tradable shares 0.25 0.28 0.19 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 1.00
6. Tobins_q 1.27 0.56 0.07 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.37 1.00
7. Dollar volume_A 22.77 1.11 0.33 -0.05 0.18 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 1.00
8. Stock exchanges 0.30 0.46 0.75 0.30 -0.19 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.08 1.00
9. Market capitalization 24.77 1.39 0.52 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.19 0.47 0.22 1.00
10. ROA 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.26 0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.34 0.04 -0.05 0.09 1.00
11. Cross-listing age 6.67 4.86 0.54 0.25 -0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.78 -0.02 -0.07 1.00
12. CEO duality 0.08 0.28 0.09 -0.12 0.14 -0.01 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.06 1.00
13. Board independence 0.38 0.08 -0.13 0.25 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.14 0.04 1.00
14. Stock option 0.02 0.15 -0.15 -0.03 0.20 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.12 0.03 0.18 1.00
15. A-H-ADR dummy 0.90 0.29 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.20 -0.10






TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for A-H Sample
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Dollar volume_H 21.30 1.90 1.00
2. Central government ownership 0.42 0.49 0.15 1.00
3. Political connection_central gov 0.04 0.20 0.16 -0.09 1.00
4. Foreign ownership 1.00 4.23 0.13 0.04 -0.05 1.00
5. Non-tradable shares 0.28 0.27 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 0.18 1.00
6. Tobins_q 1.35 0.65 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 0.24 1.00
7. Dollar volume_A 22.43 1.31 0.75 0.06 0.17 0.11 -0.02 -0.07 1.00
8. Stock exchanges 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.26 -0.09 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.12 1.00
9. Market capitalization 24.12 1.69 0.86 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.66 0.27 1.00
10. ROA 0.04 0.05 0.17 -0.13 0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.16 1.00
11. Cross-listing age 10.54 5.37 -0.47 0.06 -0.14 -0.20 -0.23 0.09 -0.44 0.13 -0.50 -0.04 1.00
12. CEO duality 0.08 0.28 -0.06 -0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 1.00
13. Board independence 0.38 0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 1.00
14. Stock option 0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.11 1.00
15. A-H-ADR dummy 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.19 0.17 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 0.25 0.42 0.41 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04







TABLE 4. A-ADR Sample and A-H Sample
Random-Effects ML regression  of Central Government Ownership and Political Connections on Foregin Market Legitimacy
U.S. Market Hong Kong Market
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables (controls) (controls)
Central government ownership -0.623*   (H1) 0.245**   (H3)
(0.309) (0.092)
Political connection_central gov 0.984*    (H2) 0.592**   (H4)
(0.436) (0.192)
Foreign ownership 0.013 0.011 -0.005 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares -0.327 -0.404 0.050 0.075
(0.377) (0.374) (0.136) (0.134)
Tobins_q -0.271 -0.404† -0.135* -0.120*
(0.227) (0.228) (0.057) (0.057)
Dollar volume_A 0.248* 0.208 0.449*** 0.436***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.041) (0.041)
Stock exchanges 4.243*** 4.571*** -0.003 -0.080
(1.115) (1.112) (0.231) (0.223)
Market capitalization 0.638*** 0.693*** 0.662*** 0.664***
(0.182) (0.180) (0.056) (0.054)
ROA -0.415 -0.825 0.676 0.695
(1.636) (1.612) (0.554) (0.549)
Cross-listing age 0.149† 0.144† 0.016 0.018
(0.088) (0.087) (0.014) (0.014)
CEO duality 0.855* 0.812* 0.012 0.033
(0.337) (0.332) (0.112) (0.111)
Board independence -1.597 -1.364 0.662 0.585
(1.524) (1.506) (0.521) (0.514)
Stock option -0.774 -0.890 -0.317† -0.353*
(0.570) (0.564) (0.169) (0.167)
A-H-ADR dummy -0.929 -0.825 0.199* 0.196*
(0.844) (0.837) (0.080) (0.079)
Constant -3.328 -3.858 -4.186** -4.008**
(4.893) (4.825) (1.355) (1.315)
LR chi2 129*** 139*** 521*** 536***
Observations (N) 303 303 544 544
Number of firms 58 58 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001






TABLE 5. A-H-ADR Sample
Random-Effects ML regression of Central Government Ownership and Political Connections on Foregin Market Legitimacy
U.S. Market Hong Kong Market
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Variables (controls) (controls)
Central government ownership -0.787**    (H1) -0.060      (H3)
(0.299) (0.106)
Political connection_central gov 1.150**     (H2) 0.471**   (H4)
(0.414) (0.150)
Foreign ownership 0.017 -0.015 -0.006 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares -0.321 -0.447 -0.063 -0.064
(0.374) (0.370) (0.134) (0.133)
Tobins_q -0.279 -0.470* -0.105 -0.142†
(0.227) (0.227) (0.081) (0.082)
Dollar volume_A 0.331** 0.280* 0.385*** 0.369***
(0.125) (0.123) (0.045) (0.044)
Stock exchanges 4.048*** 4.457*** -0.106 -0.104
(1.129) (1.072) (0.246) (0.246)
Market capitalization 0.654*** 0.743*** 0.591*** 0.624***
(0.180) (0.175) (0.064) (0.064)
ROA -0.391 -0.823 0.548 0.436
(1.583) (1.551) (0.569) (0.559)
Cross-listing age 0.146 0.135 0.018 0.027
(0.088) (0.083) (0.024) (0.023)
CEO duality 0.760* 0.722* -0.067 -0.067
(0.339) (0.331) (0.120) (0.118)
Board independence -2.326 -1.940 0.595 0.607
(1.586) (1.556) (0.568) (0.561)
Stock option -0.533 -0.589 -0.118 -0.133
(0.551) (0.540) (0.199) (0.195)
Constant -6.323 -7.374 -0.440 -0.914
(4.898) (4.743) (1.754) (1.730)
LR chi2 128*** 143*** 296*** 306***
Observations (N) 274 274 274 274
Number of firms 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001
















TABLE 6. A-H_only Sample (Firms cross-listed in Hong Kong but not in the U.S.)
Random-Effects ML regression
Hong Kong Market
Model 1 Model 2
Variables (controls)
Central government ownership 0.406**    (H3)
(0.131)
Political connection_central gov 1.072        (H4)
(0.680)
Foreign ownership 0.013 0.016
(0.012) (0.011)




Dollar volume_A 0.542*** 0.534***
(0.068) (0.067)




Cross-listing age 0.036* 0.031†
(0.016) (0.016)
CEO duality 0.133 0.122
(0.173) (0.175)
Board independence 1.215 0.613
(0.803) (0.806)




LR chi2 301*** 312***
Observations (N) 270 270
Number of firms 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001






TABLE 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for A-H-ADR Sample
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Dollar volume_ADR 16.65 3.63 1.00
2. Central government ownership 0.51 0.50 -0.01 1.00
3. Political connection_central gov 0.08 0.27 -0.05 -0.16 1.00
4. Foreign ownership 0.82 4.28 0.08 0.11 -0.06 1.00
5. Non-tradable shares 0.26 0.29 0.18 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 1.00
6. Tobins_q 1.29 0.56 0.11 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.38 1.00
7. Dollar volume_A 22.76 1.08 0.30 -0.11 0.19 0.01 -0.07 0.02 1.00
8. Stock exchanges 0.30 0.46 0.73 0.27 -0.19 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.02 1.00
9. Market capitalization 24.82 1.40 0.51 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.45 0.18 1.00
10. ROA 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.26 0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.34 0.04 -0.05 0.09 1.00
11. Cross-listing age 6.83 4.92 0.53 0.25 -0.12 0.12 0.05 0.00 -0.15 0.78 -0.06 -0.06 1.00
12. CEO duality 0.09 0.28 0.10 -0.14 0.15 -0.01 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.06 1.00
13. Board independence 0.38 0.07 -0.24 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.16 -0.05 -0.07 -0.19 0.00 1.00
14. Stock option 0.02 0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.05 0.30 1.00
15. Dollar volume_AH 22.13 1.41 0.57 -0.08 0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.60 0.09 0.79 0.13 -0.14 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03




TABLE 8. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for A-H-only Sample
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Dollar volume_H 20.46 1.96 1.00
2. Central government ownership 0.32 0.47 0.20 1.00
3. Political connection_central gov 0.01 0.09 0.10 -0.06 1.00
4. Foreign ownership 1.19 4.18 0.33 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
5. Non-tradable shares 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.00 -0.08 0.23 1.00
6. Tobins_q 1.42 0.73 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.12 1.00
7. Dollar volume_A 22.10 1.43 0.81 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.05 -0.08 1.00
8. Market capitalization 23.42 1.67 0.85 0.17 0.07 0.37 0.19 0.01 0.75 1.00
9. ROA 0.03 0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.18 1.00
10. Cross-listing age 10.60 6.06 -0.58 0.09 -0.13 -0.39 -0.30 0.13 -0.55 -0.60 -0.16 1.00
11. CEO duality 0.08 0.27 -0.09 -0.18 0.29 -0.02 0.00 0.17 -0.06 -0.12 0.10 -0.12 1.00
12. Board independence 0.38 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.24 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.00 1.00
13. Stock option 0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.16 -0.05 -0.04







TABLE 9. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Alternative Measures of Government Ownership (AH)
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. controller_central_dummy 0.419 0.494 1.000
2. state_ownership_pct 0.533 0.229 0.294 1.000
3. controller_central_pct 0.200 0.256 0.924 0.402 1.000
4. ceo_gov_central 0.042 0.201 -0.086 -0.120 -0.055 1.000
5. ceo_gov_rank 0.673 1.853 -0.095 -0.131 -0.081 0.832 1.000
6. ceo_npc 0.074 0.261 -0.239 -0.311 -0.221 0.571 0.506 1.000
7. ceo_cppcc 0.046 0.210 -0.186 -0.082 -0.172 0.259 0.243 0.174 1.000
8. ceo_communist 0.695 0.461 0.150 0.130 0.180 0.040 0.090 0.049 -0.141






TABLE 10. Post-hoc Analysis
Alternative Measures of Government Ownership
Main Model IV1=state_own_pct IV1=controller_pct
Variables
Central government ownership 0.245**   (H3)
(0.092)
IV1=state_own_pct 0.081     (H3)
(0.195)
IV1=controller_pct 0.490**   (H3)
(0.175)
Political connection_central gov 0.592**   (H4) 0.574**  (H4) 0.588**   (H4)
(0.192) (0.194) (0.192)
Foreign ownership -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares 0.075 0.049 0.090
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134)
Tobins_q -0.120* -0.134* -0.119*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Dollar volume_A 0.436*** 0.440*** 0.440***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Stock exchanges -0.080 -0.003 -0.099
(0.223) (0.225) (0.222)
Market capitalization 0.664*** 0.672*** 0.658***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
ROA 0.695 0.626 0.736
(0.549) (0.552) (0.550)
Cross-listing age 0.018 0.020 0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
CEO duality 0.033 0.008 0.035
(0.111) (0.111) (0.110)
Board independence 0.585 0.659 0.491
(0.514) (0.517) (0.516)
Stock option -0.353* -0.319† -0.317†
(0.167) (0.168) (0.167)
A-H-ADR dummy 0.196* 0.184* 0.199*
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
Constant -4.008** -4.286** -3.887**
(1.315) (1.327) (1.313)
LR chi2 536*** 529*** 537***
Observations (N) 544 544 544
Number of firms 84 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001






TABLE 11. Post-hoc Analysis
Alternative Measures of CEO Political Connections
Main Model IV2=ceo_gov_rank IV2=ceo_npc IV2=ceo_cppcc IV2=ceo_communist
Variables
Central government ownership 0.245**   (H3) 0.243** 0.248** 0.244** 0.225*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Political connection_central gov 0.592**   (H4)
(0.192)
IV2=ceo_gov_rank 0.051**   (H4)
(0.019)
IV2=ceo_npc 0.321*     (H4)
(0.153)
IV2=ceo_cppcc 0.236   (H4)
(0.217)
IV2=ceo_communist 0.132†     (H4)
(0.074)
Foreign ownership -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares 0.075 0.063 0.078 0.069 0.070
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Tobins_q -0.120* -0.127* -0.131* -0.117* -0.116*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Dollar volume_A 0.436*** 0.440*** 0.434*** 0.448*** 0.448***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Stock exchanges -0.080 -0.102 -0.054 -0.064 -0.110
(0.223) (0.227) (0.229) (0.231) (0.230)
Market capitalization 0.664*** 0.657*** 0.660*** 0.642*** 0.652***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
ROA 0.695 0.689 0.740 0.768 0.784
(0.549) (0.549) (0.550) (0.551) (0.550)
Cross-listing age 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
CEO duality 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.049
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111)
Board independence 0.585 0.594 0.554 0.583 0.566
(0.514) (0.515) (0.517) (0.518) (0.517)
Stock option -0.353* -0.346* -0.351* -0.343* -0.342*
(0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168)
A-H-ADR dummy 0.196* 0.203* 0.186* 0.212** 0.213**
(0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Constant -4.008** -3.889** -3.813** -3.759** -4.003**
(1.315) (1.329) (1.336) (1.349) (1.337)
LR chi2 536*** 534*** 531*** 528*** 530***
Observations (N) 544 544 544 544 544
Number of firms 84 84 84 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001




Table 12: Summary of Alternative Measures and Results for A-H Sample
Sample Measures of government ownership Measurement Coeff Hypotheses Supported
controler_central_dummy
A dummy variable, which was coded as 1 if the central government is the largest 
shareholder, and zero otherwise 0.245** H3 Y
state_ownership_pct
The percentage of shares owned by the government (including central and local 
governments and agencies) 0.081 H3 N
controller_central_pct
The percentage of shares owned by the central government when the central 
government is the largest shareholder 0.490** H3 Y
Sample Measures of political connections Measurement Coeff Hypotheses Supported
ceo_gov_dummy
A dummy, which was coded as 1 if CEO was former official with the central 
government, and zero otherwise 0.592** H4 Y
ceo_gov_rank
ceo_gov_rank is a rank order of CEO's political connections. The range of 
ceo_gov_rank is from 0-8. If CEO is not a former official at any level of government 
agencies, then ceo_gov_rank is coded as 0. 
8=Chief position in the central government
7=Assistant position in the central government
6=Chief position in the provincial government
5=Assistant position in the provincial government
4=Chief position at the bureau level
3=Assistant position at the bureau level
2=Chief position at the county level
1=Assistant position at the county level
0.0511** H4 Y
ceo_npc
If CEO is a current or former member of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
legislative body in China, then ceo_npc is coded as 1, and zero otherwise. 0.321* H4 Y
ceo_cppcc
If CEO is a current or former member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), an advisory board for the Chinese government, then ceo_cppcc 
is coded as 1, and zero otherwise 0.236 H4 N
ceo_communist
If CEO is a member of the communist party, then ceo_communist equals to 1, and zero 










TABLE 13. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Alternative Measures of Government Ownership (ADR)
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. controller_central_dummy 0.525 0.500 1.000
2. state_ownership_pct 0.565 0.238 0.486 1.000
3. controller_central_pct 0.275 0.281 0.934 0.528 1.000
4. ceo_gov_central 0.076 0.265 -0.176 -0.220 -0.145 1.000
5. ceo_gov_rank 1.083 2.365 -0.121 -0.252 -0.116 0.840 1.000
6. ceo_npc 0.119 0.324 -0.386 -0.467 -0.360 0.588 0.523 1.000
7. ceo_cppcc 0.059 0.237 -0.264 -0.161 -0.247 0.297 0.287 0.210 1.000
8. ceo_communist 0.769 0.422 0.231 0.127 0.220 0.009 0.076 -0.017 -0.227






TABLE 14. Post-hoc Analysis
Alternative Measures of Government Ownership
Main Model IV1=state_own_pct IV1=controller_pct
Variables
Central government ownership -0.623*   (H1)
(0.309)
IV1=state_own_pct 1.058    (H1)
(0.565)
IV1=controller_pct -0.696   (H1)
(0.508)
Political connection_central gov 0.984*    (H2) 1.047*   (H2) 1.017*   (H2)
(0.436) (0.435) (0.436)
Foreign ownership 0.011 0.015 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Non-tradable shares -0.404 -0.315 -0.396
(0.374) (0.370) (0.377)
Tobins_q -0.404† -0.347 -0.386
(0.228) (0.223) (0.229)
Dollar volume_A 0.208 0.240 0.206
(0.125) (0.126) (0.125)
Stock exchanges 4.571*** 4.186*** 4.489***
(1.112) (1.130) (1.127)
Market capitalization 0.693*** 0.651*** 0.707***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.182)
ROA -0.825 -0.504 -0.896
(1.612) (1.607) (1.624)
Cross-listing age 0.144† 0.146 0.144
(0.087) (0.089) (0.088)
CEO duality 0.812* 0.948** 0.812*
(0.332) (0.334) (0.334)
Board independence -1.364 -1.596 -1.289
(1.506) (1.500) (1.525)
Stock option -0.890 -0.864 -0.888
(0.564) (0.562) (0.566)
A-H-ADR dummy -0.825 -1.107 -0.865
(0.837) (0.862) (0.848)
Constant -3.858 -3.867 -4.235
(4.825) (4.826) (4.861)
LR chi2 139*** 138*** 137***
Observations (N) 303 303 303
Number of firms 58 58 58
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001







TABLE 15. Post-hoc Analysis
Alternative Measures of CEO Political Connections
Main Model IV2=ceo_gov_rank IV2=ceo_npc IV2=ceo_cppcc IV2=ceo_communist
Variables
Central government ownership -0.623*   (H1) -0.648*  (H1) -0.635*   (H1) -0.611*   (H1) -0.659*   (H1)
(0.309) (0.309) (0.309) (0.310) (0.310)
Political connection_central gov 0.984*    (H2)
(0.436)
IV2=ceo_gov_rank 0.070      (H2)
(0.043)
IV2=ceo_npc 0.717†      (H2)
(0.375)
IV2=ceo_cppcc 0.995*    (H2)
(0.504)
IV2=ceo_communist 0.380       (H2)
(0.251)
Foreign ownership 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Non-tradable shares -0.404 -0.425 -0.414 -0.432 -0.428
(0.374) (0.376) (0.374) (0.374) (0.376)
Tobins_q -0.404† -0.429 -0.433 -0.376 -0.334
(0.228) (0.232) (0.231) (0.228) (0.230)
Dollar volume_A 0.208 0.225 0.215 0.235 0.249*
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125)
Stock exchanges 4.571*** 4.494*** 4.662*** 4.715*** 4.453***
(1.112) (1.101) (1.114) (1.115) (1.104)
Market capitalization 0.693*** 0.676*** 0.701*** 0.607*** 0.649***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.182) (0.182) (0.180)
ROA -0.825 -0.822 -0.715 -0.637 -0.181
(1.612) (1.625) (1.615) (1.615) (1.650)
Cross-listing age 0.144† 0.145 0.139 0.134 0.149
(0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086)
CEO duality 0.812* 0.794* 0.808* 0.821* 0.841*
(0.332) (0.334) (0.333) (0.333) (0.336)
Board independence -1.364 -1.422 -1.369 -1.339 -1.162
(1.506) (1.514) (1.509) (1.509) (1.517)
Stock option -0.890 -0.851 -0.847 -0.768 -0.802
(0.564) (0.566) (0.564) (0.562) (0.564)
A-H-ADR dummy -0.825 -0.840 -0.844 -0.862 -0.775
(0.837) (0.829) (0.836) (0.835) (0.833)
Constant -3.858 -3.624 -4.2 -2.459 -4.106
(4.825) (4.836) (4.860) (4.884) (4.85029)
LR chi2 139*** 139*** 136*** 137*** 138***
Observations (N) 303 303 303 303 303
Number of firms 58 58 58 58 58
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001




Table 16: Summary of Alternative Measures and Results for A-ADR Sample
Sample Measures of government ownership Measurement Coeff Hypotheses Supported
controler_central_dummy
A dummy variable, which was coded as 1 if the central government is the largest 
shareholder, and zero otherwise -0.623* H1 Y
state_ownership_pct
The percentage of shares owned by the government (including central and local 
governments and agencies) 1.058 H1 N
controller_central_pct
The percentage of shares owned by the central government when the central 
government is the largest shareholder -0.696 H1 N
Sample Measures of political connections Measurement Coeff Hypotheses Supported
ceo_gov_dummy
A dummy, which was coded as 1 if CEO was former official with the central 
government, and zero otherwise 0.984*  H2 Y
ceo_gov_rank
ceo_gov_rank is a rank order of CEO's political connections. The range of 
ceo_gov_rank is from 0-8. If CEO is not a former official at any level of government 
agencies, then ceo_gov_rank is coded as 0. 
8=Chief position in the central government
7=Assistant position in the central government
6=Chief position in the provincial government
5=Assistant position in the provincial government
4=Chief position at the bureau level
3=Assistant position at the bureau level
2=Chief position at the county level
1=Assistant position at the county level
0.070   H2 N
ceo_npc
If CEO is a current or former member of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
legislative body in China, then ceo_npc is coded as 1, and zero otherwise. 0.717† H2 N
ceo_cppcc
If CEO is a current or former member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), an advisory board for the Chinese government, then ceo_cppcc 
is coded as 1, and zero otherwise 0.995* H2 N
ceo_communist











TABLE 17. Post-hoc Analysis
Interaction Effects of Central Government Ownership and CEO Political Connections
U.S. Market Hong Kong Market
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables Main Model Inteactions Main Model Inteactions
Central government ownership -0.623*   (H1) -0.623*  (H1) 0.245**   (H3) 0.243**  (H3)
(0.309) (0.309) (0.092) (0.092)
Political connection_central gov 0.984*    (H2) 0.955†   (H2) 0.592**   (H4) 0.548*    (H4)
(0.436) (0.490) (0.192) (0.215)
Interactions 0.141    (H5) 0.214       (H5)
(1.079) (0.473)
Foreign ownership 0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares -0.404 -0.405 0.075 0.075
(0.374) (0.374) (0.134) (0.134)
Tobins_q -0.404† -0.403† -0.120* -0.120*
(0.228) (0.228) (0.057) (0.057)
Dollar volume_A 0.208 0.209† 0.436*** 0.437***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.041) (0.041)
Stock exchanges 4.571*** 4.567 -0.080 -0.084
(1.112) (1.111) (0.223) (0.223)
Market capitalization 0.693*** 0.695 0.664*** 0.665***
(0.180) (0.181) (0.054) (0.054)
ROA -0.825 -0.819 0.695 0.697
(1.612) (1.613) (0.549) (0.549)
Cross-listing age 0.144† 0.144† 0.018 0.019
(0.087) (0.087) (0.014) (0.014)
CEO duality 0.812* 0.813 0.033 0.034
(0.332) (0.332) (0.111) (0.111)
Board independence -1.364 -1.361 0.585 0.590
(1.506) (1.506) (0.514) (0.514)
Stock option -0.890 -0.889 -0.353* -0.352*
(0.564) (0.564) (0.167) (0.167)
A-H-ADR dummy -0.825 -0.833 0.196* 0.196*
(0.837) (0.838) (0.079) (0.079)
Constant -3.858 -3.915 -4.008** -4.052**
(4.825) (4.842) (1.315) (1.317)
LR chi2 139*** 139*** 536*** 536***
Observations (N) 303 303 544 544
Number of firms 58 58 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001







TABLE 18. A-ADR Sample and A-H Sample
Random-Effects Regression  of Central Government Ownership and Political Connections on Foregin Market Legitimacy
U.S. Market Hong Kong Market
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables (controls) (controls)
Central government ownership -0.625†     (H1) 0.245**      (H3)
(0.351) (0.121)
Political connection_central gov 0.979†      (H2) 0.592**      (H4)
(0.522) (0.102)
Foreign ownership 0.018 0.011 -0.005 -0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-tradable shares -0.328 -0.404 0.057 0.077
(0.367) (0.368) (0.125) (0.123)
Tobins_q -0.279 -0.408† -0.138* -0.121*
(0.237) (0.225) (0.058) (0.059)
Dollar volume_A 0.248† 0.208 0.446*** 0.436***
(0.150) (0.148) (0.053) (0.054)
Stock exchanges 4.235*** 4.568*** -0.022 -0.083
(0.814) (0.782) (0.191) (0.204)
Market capitalization 0.645*** 0.696*** 0.671*** 0.666***
(0.189) (0.201) (0.060) (0.057)
ROA -0.390 -0.816 0.680 0.696
(2.371) (2.326) (0.671) (0.646)
Cross-listing age 0.149† 0.144† 0.017 0.018
(0.088) (0.082) (0.014) (0.014)
CEO duality 0.863** 0.815** 0.016 0.033
(0.297) (0.298) (0.092) (0.092)
Board independence -1.587 -1.358 0.687 0.588
(2.196) (2.091) (0.537) (0.555)
Stock option -0.787† -0.897 -0.324 -0.355*
(0.458) (0.548) (0.204) (0.198)
A-H-ADR dummy -0.934 -0.827 0.206 0.197
(1.021) (1.172) (0.096*) (0.092*)
Constant -3.493 -3.927 -4.361* -4.036*
(5.240) (5.375) (1.779) (1.725)
R-square 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.86
Wald chi2 522*** 516*** 1379*** 1725***
Observations (N) 303 303 544 544
Number of firms 58 58 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001





TABLE 19. A-ADR Sample and A-H Sample
Fixed-Effects Regression  of Central Government Ownership and Political Connections on Foregin Market Legitimacy
U.S. Market Hong Kong Market
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables (controls) (controls)
Central government ownership -0.525       (H1) 0.194†     (H3)
(0.371) (0.115)
Political connection_central gov 1.254*      (H2) 0.466†     (H4)
(0.507) (0.241)
Foreign ownership 0.013 0.012 -0.004 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Non-tradable shares -0.296 -0.348 0.020 0.025
(0.410) (0.407) (0.150) (0.149)
Tobins_q -0.032 -0.190 -0.045 -0.043
(0.247) (0.250) (0.063) (0.063)
Dollar volume_A 0.257† 0.210 0.484*** 0.476***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.045) (0.045)
Stock exchanges
Market capitalization 0.341 0.443† 0.425*** 0.446***
(0.244) (0.245) (0.079) (0.079)
ROA -0.939 -1.235 0.749 0.709
(1.720) (1.700) (0.575) (0.573)
Cross-listing age -0.015 -0.006 -0.064** -0.068***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.020) (0.020)
CEO duality 0.646† 0.650† -0.050 -0.023
(0.370) (0.367) (0.123) (0.123)
Board independence -1.860 -1.738 0.393 0.382
(1.715) (1.698) (0.581) (0.578)
Stock option -0.455 -0.478 -0.204 -0.230
(0.621) (0.613) (0.176) (0.176)
A-H-ADR dummy 0.087 0.102
(0.087) (0.087)
Constant 3.146 2.025 0.738 0.385
(5.986) (5.973) (1.698) (1.698)
R-square 0.27 0.20 0.77 0.78
F 3.54*** 3.69*** 29.12*** 26.81***
Observations (N) 303 303 544 544
Number of firms 58 58 84 84
Standard errors in parentheses; †  p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001
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